Russian WWII Offensive Of 1941 Essay, Research Paper
It was devastatingly cold in the Russian winter of 1941,
during the peak of the German offensive against Moscow. Just as it
had Napoleon’s armies in the century before, the Russian winter
conditions had stopped the advance on Moscow. Hitler had not planned
on a winter war, and thus had not properly equipped his troop
frostbite, and thousands of them died of exposure. Indeed, it was this
biting winter which had provided the Russians with an opportunity to
gather themselves, and prepare for one of the most heroic
counter-offensives of World War II – known to the Russian people as
“The Great Patriotic War.”
It would be wrong to attribute the German failure at this time
solely to the harsh winter; the main failure was that of misjudgment
and mistiming. The offensive had been launched too late in the year,
at a season where the weather was due to break up. The Germans had
underestimated the effects of the harsh weather and terrain on their
motorized units, and had poorly rationed their resources – too much
had been asked of the German troops, and strengths had been allowed to
drop too low.
Despite a few more victories by German forces in November and
December, they would never again substantially advance into the areas
surrounding Moscow. On October 28th, the German 3 Panzer group, under
the command of Field-Marshal Von Kluge, had again tried to penetrate
into the northern area of Kalinin, and failed. Hitler called in 9
Army to join the 3 Panzer, and moved them towards the northeast area
above Moscow. Russian resistance had been uneven, but in the front of
Tula and on the Nara, where new formations were arriving, it had been
the most determined and tough. The Red Army had fallen back to within
forty miles of Moscow, but was sustained by massive Muscovite power, a
continuing flow of troops to the front line.
During the months of October and November, nine new Russian
armies had been trained, and were being deployed throughout the
fronts. Two complete armies and parts of another three were to reach
the Moscow area towards the end of November. Many of the divisions in
these armies were raised from newly inducted recruits, but some were
well trained and equipped and had been withdrawn from the military
districts in Central Russia, and Siberia.
In October and early November, a few German battalions still
fighting had brought all Red Army motor vehicles (except tanks) to a
stop, and the Russian Quarter-master-General Khrulev, was forced to
switch his troops to horses and carts. He was criticized by both his
own troops and Stalin, but was granted permission to form 76 horse
transport battalions. The problems caused by the transport shortage
and weather were recognized by the Soviet High Command, and fuel
refills were sent to the front lines. Defenses were restored and
thickened up, and Moscow awaited the second stage of the German
offensive, which is described in detail in the German Offensive
section of this report. By November however, German casualties had
reached 145,000 troops.
The German position in the South, between Tula and Voronezh
was both confusing and disquieting, as on October 26, German 2 Panzer
leader Guderian had suddenly been attacked by the renewed Russian
forces on the east flank, and was fighting to hold his ground. The 2
Panzer had been meant to surround Moscow, but was so weak in armor,
and with the addition of several infantry corps, its mobile strength
was greatly decreased.
As the German drive against Moscow slackened, the Soviet
commander on the Moscow front, General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov,
on December 6 inaugurated the first great counteroffensive with
strokes against Bock’s right in the Elets (Yelets) and Tula sectors
south of Moscow and against his center in the Klin and Kalinin sectors
to the northwest. Levies of Siberian troops, who were extremely
effective fighters in cold weather, were used for these offensives.
There followed a blow at the German left, in the Velikie Luki sector;
and the counteroffensive, which was sustained throughout the winter of
1941-42, soon took the form of a triple convergence toward Smolensk.
Before the end of the year Kinzel (the head of the Foreign
Armies East intelligence), was to issue a rewrite of the German Army
handbook on the Soviet Armed forces which contrasted the report put
out that year before. The Red Army, it said, had been made into a
fighting force serviceable to a degree that would not have been
thought possible before the war. What was most astonishing was not
its numerical strength, but rather the great stocks of available
weapons, equipment, clothing, tanks, and guns. German intelligence
was surprised that Soviet High Command recognized and remedied its own
weaknesses, their organizational powers, and the ability of the High
Command and the troops in the field to overcome their difficulties by
improvisation.
The first day of December was one of terrible implications for
the German forces in Moscow, and within the German High Command. On
that morning, Hitler himself had issued three telegrams: one removing
General Von Rundstedt from command of the German 5 Panzer Army in
Russia; the second ordering the attack of 1 Panzer Army on the
southern city of Voroshilovgrad; and the third demand
per Panzer Division be sent to General von Kleist, who’s forces were
being defeated by Russian General Cherevichenko on the Ukrainian
front. This erupted into chaos around the German high command, and
left Hitler in control of the crucial 5 Panzer Army, a crucial
division near Moscow: a command he was ill qualified to take.
These Soviet counteroffensives tumbled back the exhausted
Germans, lapped around their flanks, and produced a critical
situation. From generals downward, the invaders were filled with
ghastly thoughts of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow. In that emergency
Hitler forbade any retreat beyond the shortest possible local
withdrawals. His decision exposed his troops to awful sufferings in
their advanced positions facing Moscow, for they had neither the
clothing nor the equipment for a Russian winter campaign; but if they
had once started a general retreat it might easily have degenerated
into a panic-stricken rout.
The Red Army’s winter counteroffensive continued for more than
three months after its December launching, though with diminishing
progress. By March 1942 it had advanced more than 150 miles in some
sectors. But the Germans maintained their hold on the main bastions of
their winter front despite the fact that the Soviets had often
advanced many miles beyond these bastions, which were in effect cut
off. In retrospect it became clear that Hitler’s objection to any
major withdrawals worked out in such a way as to restore the
confidence of the German troops and probably saved them from a
widespread collapse. Nevertheless, they paid a heavy price indirectly
for that rigid defense. The tremendous strain of that winter
campaign, on armies that had not been prepared for it, had other
serious effects. Before the winter ended, many German divisions were
reduced to barely a third of their original strength, and they were
never fully built up again.
In early January, as soon as it was known that the Germans
were in retreat, the Red Army troops were spurred into motion, and
their morale and fighting spirit increased greatly – along with Soviet
casualties. For the Russians began to counter-attack without regard
to losses, flinging themselves at the German rearguards. Zhukov was
forced to change his tactics and order his troops to avoid all centers
of enemy resistance – as he was being smashed at such points. As soon
as the gaps in the German positions could be found, the Russians
struck there. The Red Army was well equipped for winter warfare and
was much more mobile than their enemy. But, as Zhukov admits, they
were still poorly trained, and their Field Commanders were still
hesitant to attack gaps in the German line, as they still feared
encirclement. Stalin, at the time, was convinced that the Germans
were still benumbed by the cold, and that the entire front was ripe
for the taking. However, Zhukov knew that the only vulnerable front
was the Army Group Center; their other positions in Valdai, Volkov, or
the Ukraine were unlikely to yield any further successes. However,
Stalin hastily attacked the flanks of the Army Group Center, which
would give Zhukov’s army a fierce fight, and casualties and delays
were high. Stalin’s mistake, in the end, was overestimating Russian
strength, and underestimating German resilience – especially under the
F?rhrer’s strict command not to fall back.
By the end of April, the Russians had pushed back the German
Kalinin, North-West, and Bryansk until Russian army groups could push
them back no further. These German forces were no longer capable of
any advancement into Russia, and were bogged down by the spring mud.
The Russian 33 and 39 Soviet Armies remained in the pocket of the
remaining “horseshoe” shaped German front (known as the Rzhev Salient,
and maintained by three Panzer armies), where the Army Group Center
continued to fend off struggling Russian forces. However, the forces
around the Rzhev Salient were strained and barely able to continue
holding the front. Yet Hitler maintained them there, hoping to
someday launch another offensive from that point. By March of 1942
however, the F?rhrer had lost all his interest in ever taking the
Russian capital. Thus ends the story of the siege on Moscow, and
begins the long story of the rebuilding.
Germany, had it mobilized its forces completely in 1941, would
have been able to take Russia within a matter of months. However,
being spread as they were between both the Eastern and Western fronts,
it became an exponentially more difficult task for him – one which he
never succeeded in. Hitler’s egotistical caprice drove him away from
victory. He fought on three fronts, and made the United States an
enemy of Germany; against such odds he could not win. His decision to
fork off from the attack on Moscow, detaching all but one Panzer Army
from Army Group Center to send them to Leningrad and the Ukraine meant
that the capital would never be taken by German troops. By the time
they re-grouped within Army Group Center in February, it was too late
and too muddy for them to cover the distance from Smolensk to Moscow.
The war had resulted in losses of 860,000 troops for the Germans.
Soviet prisoners taken during that time were 3,461,000 along with
perhaps double that in casualties on the Leningrad, Muscovite, and
Ukrainian fronts.