’s Theory Essay, Research Paper
Iranian Revolution using Crane Brinton’s theory. Iran is a country located in the Middle East. The mainsource of income for the country is oil, the one object that hadgreatly influenced its history. Iran’s present government is runas an Islamic Republic. A president, cabinet, judicial branch,and Majilesor or legislative branch, makes up the governmentalpositions. A revolution that overthrew the monarch, which wasset in 1930, lasted over 15 years. Crane Brinton’s book, AnAnatomy of a Revolution, explains set of four steps a countryexperiences when a revolution occurs. Symptoms, rising fever,crisis, and convalescence are the steps that occur. The IranianRevolution followed the four steps in Crane Brinton’s theory,symptoms, rising fever, crisis, and convalescence occurred. Numerous symptoms led to the crumbling downfall of Reza ShahPahlavi, ruler of Iran until 1978. One of these symptoms isrising expectations which can be seen during the 1960’s and 70’s. The rich Shah cleared the way for the land reform law, enacted in1962. The land minority had to give up its land to thegovernment, and among those stripped of land, were the Shi’ahMuslims. Iran’s power structure was radically changed in aprogram termed the “White Revolution”. On January 26, 1963, theWhite Revolution was endorsed by the nation. By 1971, when landdistribution ended, about 2,500,000 families of the farmpopulation benefited from the reforms. From 1960-72 thepercentage of owner occupied farmland in Iran rose from 26 to 78percent. Per capita income rose from $176 in 1960 to $2,500 in1978. From 1970-77 the gross national product was reported toincrease to an annual rate of 7.8% (”Iran” 896). As a result ofthis thriving economy, the income gap rapidly widened. Exclusivehomes, extravagant restaurants, and night clubs and streetsloaded with expensive automobiles served as daily reminders of agrowing income spread. This created a perfect environment formany conflicts to arise between the classes. Iran’s elite class consisted of wealthy land owners,intelligencia, military leaders, politicians, and diplomats. TheElite continued to support the monarchy and the Shah. Thepeasants were victim of unfulfilled political expectations,surveillance by the secret police, and the severe social andeconomic problems that resulted from modernization. The middleclass favored socialism over capitalism, because capitalism intheir view supported the elite, and does not benefit the lowerclasses. The middle class was the most changeable element in thegroup, because they enjoyed some of the privileges of the elite,which they would like to protect. At the same time, theybelieved that they had been cheated by the elite out of theirshare of the industrialization wealth (Orwin 43). About this time, the middle class, which included students,technocrats, and modernist professionals, became discontent withthe economy. The key event should have further stabilized theroyal dictatorship, but the increase in oil prices and oil incomebeginning in 1974 caused extreme inflation. This was due to theinvestment strategy followed by the Shah, which led to aspectacular 42% growth rate in 1974. (Cottam 14). And because ofthe Shah’s support structure which enabled the new rich tobenefit from inflation, the government effort to deal withinflation was aimless. Poor Iranians and Iranians with a fixedincome suffered major losses in real income. Better standards ofliving were no longer visible. Thus, the majority of the Iranianpeople developed a revolutionary predisposition. As the middle class became discontent in Iran throughout the1970’s, the desertion of intellectuals could be found in greatexcess. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini represented much of thediscontent of the religious sector of Iran. For speaking outagainst the Shah’s autocratic rule, Khomeini was exiled to Turkeyin 1963. In 1965, Khomeini moved to Iraq where he became thecentral spokesperson for expatriate opposition to the Shah. OnOctober 6, 1978, Khomeini was expelled from Iraq and moved toParis, where he was accessible to a larger body of oppositionforces. He was also accessible to the Western Press. Khomeinipreached that he would displace the Shah and expel theforeigners. He also said he would enforce religious andtraditional values, and redirect Iran’s wealth away from largeindustrialization schemes and toward reforms needed by the commonpeople. Throughout the 1970’s, Khomeini gained tremendouspopularity with the masses, and he became the symbol of theopposition towards the Shah. As Khomeini gained popularity, many religious groups grew innumbers and in status. In the early 1950’s, the technocrats hadshowed core support for Mohammad Mossedeq and Iran’s nationalmovement. They saw Mossadeq’s overthrow as the removal of thesymbolic leader of the Iranian nation by an American directedcoup d’etat. Many of his followers formed groups in oppositionto the Shah. Leaders of the Freedom Front, one of the groupsthat grew out of the Mossadeq movement, were a group composed ofintellectuals who tended to be centrist in philosophy, morereligious, anti-Marxist, and militant (Cottam 13). Theyrecognized Khomeini’s large and potentially enormous following,and associated themselves with him The rise of religious opposition groups and Khomeini provedto be a great test for the Shah. As time progressed the weaknessof the Shah became apparent. Waves of opposition began buildingafter 1975, due to the formation of the Rastakhiz , the legalpolitical party in Iran, and the banning of opposition politicalparties. It also became clear that the increased oil revenuesfollowing oil price increases, were spent on arms andindustrialization. In mid-1977 the religious leaders begandemonstrating against the modernization brought on by the Shah. In November, several people were killed when police broke updemonstrations. As time went on, protests became more radical. To try and quiet dissent, the Shah became more of a dictator. Asa result, those who had been moderate in demands for reformbecame more radical. In the fall of 1978, strikes against theoil industry, the post office, government factories, and banksdemolished the economy. This pattern continued throughout mostof 1978 (Orwin 45). As these protests became more frequent therewere more and more people killed. This reflects the Shah’s lossof power over his government and his people. In late 1978, the Shah came to the conclusion that he wouldand could not rule a country in which he had to stand in theflowing blood of his people. In short, he understood that hecould not militarily occupy his own country. The Shah’s earlymistakes had been devastating as the years went on. His forcefulactions did not work and it’s no wonder that his grip weakenedand his mid wavered. These events all led to the march against the government ofthe Shah, in which eight million Iranians protested on December10, 1978 (Bill 25). One-fifth of the Iranian government waswilling to join in a massive and nonviolent manifestation ofopposition even though most of them knew that thousands of theircountrymen had been shot in previous demonstrations. The bannersand slogans made clear the religious and political essence of therevolutionary movement. This massive demonstration was theturning point from symptoms to rising fever. It clearlyreflected the weakness of the Shah, and the inevitability ofrevolution in Iran. After a year of public demonstrations against him, the Shahof Iran left Tehran on January 16, 1979, for an “extendedvacation” (Orwin 46). He left the country in the hands of aregency council and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, who was aformer member of the National Front. The opposition leader, Khomeini, was to become the newruler, and he returned to Iran on February 1, 1979. Khomeinioccupied preeminent positions among Iran’s most respectedreligious scholars, the Mujahedin-e Khalq.. Although Khomeiniwanted a stable government that could cope with the problems ofreconstruction, he wanted to eradicate the evil roots of the oldsystem, which he describes as satanic. He denounced thematerialism of the recent past and called for a climate in whichsocial justice would prevail. On April 1, 1979, after a landslide victory in a nationalreferendum, Khomeini declared an Islamic republic. This republicconsisted of a new constitution reflecting Khomeini’s ideals ofIslamic government. He was named Iran’s political and religiousleader for life. Khomeini tapped the deep-seated conservatism ofthe Muslim fundamentalists by making moderate changes in the law. Women were required to wear the veil, Western music and alcoholwere banned, and the punishments described by Islamic law werereinstated. Political vengeance was taken, executing hundreds ofpeople who had worked with the Shah’s regime (”Iran” 897). The large moderate center composed of the professional andbourgeois middle class had proved to be ineffective in theirleadership abilities. Moderate Bakhtiar, the last prime ministerunder Pahlavi rule, was very unpopular, and he was unable tocompromise with his former National Front colleagues or withKhomeini. He was then forced to flee to France. On April 1, 1979, his replacement, Mehdi Bazergan wasappointed by Khomeini (Cottam 15). This 73-year-old engineer wasa leader of the Freedom Front, and president of the committee ofhuman rights. The middle and upper middle classes looked toBazergan to provide stability so the economy would recover andthe government services could be restored. Bazergan appointed acabinet, mainly, from the ranks of the Freedom Front, theNational Front, and the religious bureaucracy. Bazergan’sposition was weak, however, and he steadily lost ground to thedue to the attacks from the far right and left. As their base ofsupport narrowed, their dependence on Khomeini intensified. During this time, Iran’s relation with the US went downhill. It reached a stage of outright confrontation, when, on November4, 1979, 500 extremist students seized the US embassy in Tehran. They took hostage 66 citizens at the embassy and the foreignministry (”The Iranian Revolution” 835). The takeover seeminglysanctioned by Khomeini, continued for the next 444 days, andAmerican-Iranian relations sunk to an all-time low. This led totrade conflicts with the United States and its allies, causingeconomic problems. During the rising fever stage there is a presence of a dualgovernment. During Bazergan’s rule, it became difficult toadminister justice with a court system that had been particularlylenient to the royal will. To deal with these problems on atemporary basis. Khomeini set up a system of revolutionarycommittees presided over by a revolutionary council. Religiousleaders clearly predominated in the revolutionary council-committee-courts system, which came to be almost a parallelgovernment. In November, 1979, Bazergan resigned, and in his placeKhomeini appointed Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr was anidealist, a bookworm, and most personally ambitious of all theliberal revolutionaries. Like the other moderates, he was arepresentative of the professional middle class, who had littleskill or patience to build political organizations. Bani Sadr’s
efforts were fruitless in dealing with the hostage releases. After being elected Iran’s first president in January 1980, heand his followers, out of self defense and desperation, formed analliance with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (”Iran” 897). He alsoattempted to work hard to establish close relations with themilitary leaders. He ineffectively tried to appeal to theIranian people, who had little in common with a Paris trainedintellectual. One can see that du
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