Sulkowski Essay, Research Paper
From SULKOM@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu Wed Feb 9 19:00:49 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu by ponyexpress.princeton.edu (5.65c/1.113/newPE)id AA08661; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 19:00:47 -0500Received: from ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu by ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu (PMDF V4.2-14 #5889) id ; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 18:55:43 ESTDate: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 18:55:43 -0500 (EST)From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personalTo: bdcaplan@phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN%”bdcaplan@phoenix.Princeton.edu”Mime-Version: 1.0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: R To: Bryan Douglas Caplan I posted this message earlier:>>1. The morality-math analogy. I’m not sure why Sulkowski places>>exclusive emphasis on my mathematics example; if you recall my original>>posting, I also adduced two decidedly non-mathematical instances of the>>use of direct reason.>>That’s correct. I do remember that. However, you specifically>stated that since direct reason worked for you in math, then there was>no reason to suppose it didn’t work in morality — a claim I dispute.>>[......................]>As to your question of whether philosophy fails without direct>reason, I will state again that I am not quite sure what you believe>direct reason to be. Philosophy relies on conceptual thinking and>(hopefully) perceptual evidence. What else is necessary?In case you responded to this already, I didn’t get the response.My account has been filling up on occasion. If you still have a copy ofit, send it to me in email. If you haven’t posted it yet, send me acarbon copy in email. Thanks!Mark | “Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by theAndrew | constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state, andSulkowski | absolutely no one can be forced or legislated into a state | of blessedness; the means required are faithful and brotherlySec/Treas | admonition, sound education, and, above all, free use of the NFLP | individual judgment.” — SpinozaFrom slagle@sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.com Thu Feb 10 09:52:12 1994Received: from eagle.is.lmsc.lockheed.com by ponyexpress.princeton.edu (5.65c/1.113/newPE)id AA10858; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:52:10 -0500Received: from sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.com by eagle.is.lmsc.lockheed.com (5.65/Ultrix4.3-C)id AA06464; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 06:50:12 -0800Received: by sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.com (920110.SGI/911001.SGI)for bdcaplan@phoenix.Princeton.EDU id AA03907; Thu, 10 Feb 94 06:51:59 -0800Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 06:51:59 -0800From: slagle@sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.com (Mark Slagle)Message-Id: To: bdcaplan@phoenixCc: libernet-d@Dartmouth.EDUIn-Reply-To: Bryan Douglas Caplan’s message of Sun, 6 Feb 94 21:51:18 ESTSubject: Questions About Direct Reason AnsweredReply-To: slagle@lmsc.lockheed.comStatus: RBryan Douglas Caplan writes:> Mark Sulkowski’s latest reply leaves me with the feeling that I should> do a lot more work to make my position clear, and I am happy to do so.> 1. What is direct reason?Well, I read your whole explanation, and I’m afraid I don’t findthe matter any more clear than before. In a nutshell, whatdistinguishes this “direct reason” of yours from garden varietyintuition, or from divine revelation for that matter? And whyshould we regard it as any more trustworthy?=Mark—-Mark E. Slagle PO Box 61059slagle@lmsc.lockheed.com Sunnyvale, CA 94088408-756-0895 USAFrom SULKOM@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu Thu Feb 10 22:25:10 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu by ponyexpress.princeton.edu (5.65c/1.113/newPE)id AA01939; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 22:25:08 -0500Received: from ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu by ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu (PMDF V4.2-14 #5889) id ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 20:36:12 ESTDate: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 20:36:12 -0500 (EST)From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personal: direct reasonTo: bdcaplan@phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN%”bdcaplan@phoenix.Princeton.edu”Mime-Version: 1.0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: R From: Bryan Douglas Caplan >I’m glad we’re taking this to e-mail, since it seems to have gotten a little>technical.A *little* technical? > And by the way, hello.Hi there. Pleasure to talk with you.>1. How does direct reason differ from garden variety intuition? [......]>2. How does direct reason differ from divine revelation? [......]Okay, this info was interesting but just so you know you wereresponding to Mark Slagle, a different chap.I was asking you if you had responded to a previous post of mine.Mr. Slagle may have been responding to that response of yours. (Thisis getting a little confusing.)Anyway, I’m not SURE that you wrote this response. All I knowis that my account filled up earlier this week and I might have missedit. I pointed out to you that your concept of direct reason wasunclear to me. I believe I asked for some clarification. Sending itto me through email is fine with me.And now onto your response to Slagle.>1. How does direct reason differ from garden variety intuition? Well,>garden-variety intuition is one species of direct reason, I suppose.You suppose? Then perhaps you aren’t very clear on what directreason is either. What are you clear on about it?>Also, garden-variety intuition is probably less self-critical and>thoughtful than our better direct reasonings are; that is, garden-variet>intuition is probably our knee-jerk reaction, whereas something known>well through direct reason is reached after reflection and careful thought.Is this “self-critical and thoughtful” aspect of successfullyapplying direct reason _part_of_ the faculty of direct reason, or is itsomething else (perhaps the most conscious and volitional level of ourchoice and ability to think)? Since I am still unclear on what youimagine direct thinking to be, this question may seem off-target to you.>2. How does direct reason differ from divine revelation? Well, I presume>that you don’t believe in divine revelation, and neither do I.Okay.>Well, I think that looking>at a philosopher like Aquinas will shed a little light on this. >Basically, philosophers who believed in revelation also frequently>believed in “the natural light of reason,” which is probably yet>another synonym for direct reason.Possibly… I’m no scholar of Aquinas, but “the natural lightof reason” does not strike me as necessarily having anything to do withyour direct reason. Aquinas may simply have had a good appreciationfor the ability of people to think and learn about what they observe.I don’t know of any statement of his that other forms ofreasoning are incomplete without direct reasoning (or “the naturallight of reason”).>But what is it that’s really bugging you about direct reason? I suspect>that it is the popular but mistaken notion that everything must be>”proven.”Maybe… I don’t demand that things be proven without a doubt.We may always suffer some form of doubt about our beliefs. I just wantan _explanation_ for a specific conclusion other than just “it’s obvious!”Perhaps there are “obvious” beliefs. I place a high degree of confidenceon beliefs based on observations under reasonable conditions of observation.For example, if I am reasonably convinced that I am awake and notdelusional, and I cross a street, and I see quite clearly and sharplythat a car is moving towards me with deadly speed, then that is certainlyenough observational evidence to convince me to jump out of the way.I’m not sure how big a role concepts play here. The feeling ofdanger may be geared into a very quick and “low level” evaluation ofthe motion of objects. This feeling of danger might carry a feelingof “obviousness”.Perhaps the concept actually forms afterwards. “That car couldhave killed me!” However, at this point any “obviousness” of the natureof the situation is of a different sort. Now that I have the time tomore fully and critically evaluate the situation, I can bring to bearcertain ideas like “fast moving, heavy, solid objects can seriouslydamage human health”. I can think about other people who actually arehurt seriously by such objects. I can _explain_ why I think that itis obvious that I could have been hurt. I am not left crying “but it’sobvious and apparent” as if that explained everything.Let me know how my hypothetical situation relates to direct reason,if at all.>But of course that can’t be true, because first of all it>leads to an infinite regress, since you would then have to prove your>proofs, prove the proofs of your proofs, and so on. And second of all>it is impossible because a proof only yields truth if its premises are>true, and hence on pain of circularity some premises must be known without>proof.We need some axioms, yes. And this is a serious question.>Or perhaps its because of the related notion that intuition is unreliable>and must be “formalized.”Well…backed up with something.>Haven’t you ever made an argument and found that another person just couldn’t>”get it?”No never. Yes, of course.>If you clearly saw that the argument was valid, did it matter that the>other person couldn’t see it? Actually, yes. I’d want to know what his premises/observations are.Maybe mine are wrong or incomplete.>That’s what I think about direct reason. I see that some things are true>objectively. And if other people don’t see it, why should that shake my>confidence?> –BryanUnfortunately, this still doesn’t do much to help me understandwhat direct reason is. I realize that you are trying to solve the problemof finding end-points to proof. But the existence of a problem does notdemand that there already be a solution. Perhaps we as humans are doomed
to some uncertainty about these most basic assumptions/axioms/end-points.Consider it job security for philosophers.Maybe the situation is better than this and observation can playa big role in providing a foundation for our beliefs. We then need tounderstand how we get from Perceptions -> Concepts. This may requirea greater understanding of the workings of our brain.Perhaps that is what your direct reason is — hardwired logicor concept manipulation? Still, it would be nice to doublecheck theusefulness of that someh
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