’s 1862 Valley Campaign Essay, Research Paper
Many traits are associated with Thomas Jonathan Jackson and his
leadership in the confederacy. He is known for stark determination, military
genius beyond all others, and the ability to turn any army into a fighting machine.
Jackson became legendary when a South Carolina general, seeking to rally his
own men at Bull Run, pointed to Jackson and shouted, ?Look, there is Jackson
and his men standing like a stone wall against the enemy.? Thus he forever
became ?Stonewall? Jackson. Jackson?s military legacy had begun even before
this moment, when he diverted 20,000 northern troops in the Shenendoah Valley
of Virginia, with only 7,000 troops of him own. The image of Stonewall Jackson
has forever been one of the most fascinating associated with Civil War military
operation.
However, the true military genius of Jackson lies in his understanding of
movement in war. He could maneuver a brigade under the nose of opposing
armies, march his men farther and faster than anyone before, and understood
the critical importance of railroads to the war effort. Using all these techniques,
he single-handedly distracted much of the Union force headed to Richmond
(including McClellan). The operations of Jackson in the Shenendoah during the
first half of the year 1862 constitute one of the most brilliant episodes of military
movement in history and continue to be a standard for military study today.
Beginning with the Battle of Kernstown on March 23 and ending with the
Battle of Fort Republic on June 9, Stonewall Jackson produced the single
greatest military operation in the Civil War. The almost impossible marches, the
unbelievable defeats of armies triple the size of his own, and the continuous
confusion the Union faced made his maneuvers legendary. Two factors gave
the region military value. The Army of Northern Virginia was almost dependent
on its agricultural products. And secondly, it became a fortress that had to be
occupied to advance into Virginia (specifically Richmond) [Appendix A].
Jackson recognized that this valley was the key to military movement, and
military supremacy, in the eastern theater.
Soon after the battle of Bull Run ?Jackson was promoted to command the
Valley District of Virginia.?1 His command revolved solely around the
Shenendoah, of which the Union forces held Romney and the north side of the
Potomac. Jackson had only a small regiment at his disposal to try and regain
this territory. The campaign had no definitive beginning, but the movement
during the month of March signaled the first action. On March 23 at Kernstown,
Jackson was handed his only ?loss? when he battled Nathaniel Banks and his
9000 men with less than 3000 of his own men. Jackson?s regiment was routed,
but the battle caused Banks to postpone his move on Washington, thus ?freezing
a large body of union troops in the valley?2. Moreover, it ?convinced President
Lincoln that Jackson?s army could be cut of and destroyed.?3 He now retired up
the valley. He appeared suddenly at McDowell on May 8 and sent a Federal
force on retreat. One confederate officer recalled the effects of the battle:
?Jackson?s prompt action and bold attack had completely changed McClellan?s
plans, and instead of establishing Banks near Manassas, he ordered him to
remain in the valley, and even sent [reinforcements], to aid in driving back
Jackson?.4 ?Marching with the speed that earned his troops the nickname the
?foot cavalry? he attacked and defeated a small union garrison at Front Royal?5
and then fell upon Bank?s retreating main army at Winchester on May 25. Here
he defeated 64,000 troops with his own 17,000 by flanking his position in the
city. Stonewall Jackson?s small valley army had ?turned the tables on Banks and
the Washington government, and now held control of the entire Shenendoah.?6
Threatened by Jackson?s close proximity to Washington, Lincoln diverted
Federal troops to surround his army. Jackson watched three Federal columns
converge to destroy him, but narrowly escaped by falling back on Harper?s Ferry
on May 31, forcing part of his army to march 50 miles in two days to elude the
trap. Jackson continued to withdraw up the valley with Union forces in hot
pursuit. Jackson foresaw the two Federal columns? converging on Port
Republic; therefore, he concentrated forces there and kept Fremont and Shields
separated. General Richard Ewell held off Fremont?s forces at Cross Keys to
allow Jackson time to plan a strike. Jackson?s forces crossed the Shenendoah
River and attacked Shields on June 9. After a vicious battle, the Federals were
routed and retreated northward, leaving Jackson ?master of the Valley.?7 He had
?thwarted every Union effort made against him.?8 He did so through a
combination of hard marches, knowledge of terrain, unexpected tactics,
singleness of purpose, heavy attacks concentrated at one point, and self
confidence arising from the thought that God was on his side. However,
Jackson?s rout is explained best by his own words to an officer at the battle of
Cross Keys:
Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible.
And when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit
so long as your men have strength to follow. Such tactics win
every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in
detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible.9
Adroitly executing his astute military intellect, Jackson had ?occupied
nearly 60,000 troops in the fruitless effort to bring him to bay.?10
These movements had a profound impact on the Civil War, having both
immediate and lasting effects. The most obvious effect is the diversion Jackson
caused on Union forces heading toward Richmond. Becuase of Jackson?s
movements, Lincoln dispatched 20,000 troops to check him. While these troops
were on there way, Jackson stealthily slipped between them and stationed at
Ashland, directly north of the capital. ?Protecting Richmond was the key to
Confederate success?11, and Jackson preserved its safety with his movements
in the Valley.
Each battle in the campaign had strong ramifications that were felt in
Washington and throughout the Union. The bold attack on Kernstown, though
unsuccessful, led to many important results. The first effect was the recall of
Federal troops from Manassas to the Valley by the petition of General Shields.
He explained the reasoning behind this move stating, ?Though the battle had
been won, I still could not believe Jackson would have [struck] so far from the
main body without reinforcements; so to be prepared for such a contingency, I
set to bring together all the troops within my reach.?12 Thus a body of 20,000
troops was thought necessary to guard against Jackson?s 3000 and the
imaginary reinforcements. McClellan was also deprived of 10,000 men in his
command that were placed defending against Jackson. And finally Lincoln felt
so insecure over the defense of Washington, that he ordered McDowell?s entire
corps to be added to 70,000 already in defense, rather than letting them assist
McClellan. Thus by striking to prevent General Johnston from leaving the
Valley, Jackson had accomplished much more than he expected. His ?trickery?
had achieved all he could have hoped for.
At the tactical level, the battle of McDowel
However, strategically it was a brilliant success for Jackson and the South.
Through the use of terrain and leadership, Jackson demonstrated his ability to
concentrate his men against a smaller section of the opposition, without letting
the opposition concentrate against him. The news of Banks defeat here caused
the Federal government to call upon all the states to send militias to protect
Washington against the pursuit. Jackson was showing the Union that the
Confederacy was not going to be easily defeated. He carried the momentum of
this win to Front Royal and Winchester later in the month.
At Front Royal and Winchester the Federal forces came to learn that
?Jackson was not to be caught by any of the combination of movements they
could bring about.?13 While it was true he had only a quarter of the men
concentrating on his rear, he had no doubt of the ability to divide these forces
and meet them on his own grounds with superior tactical strength.
The battle of Cross Keys signaled the end of the campaign with the end of
the pursuit on Jackson. Here he brilliantly defeated two separated armies under
the command of Fremont and Shields by deft maneuvering and clever use of
terrain. With this double victory, Jackson ended his campaign and was free to
join Lee at Seven Pines.
In this exciting months campaign, Jackson made great captures of stores
and prisoners; but this was not the chief result. Without gaining a single tactical
victory, he had achieved a great strategic victory, for by skillfully moving his
15,000 men, he had neutralized a force of 60,000. It is perhaps not too much to
say that he saved Richmond, for he had caused McClellan?s forces to be greatly
diverted to the Valley and not concentrated on Richmond.
However, this diversion was not the goal of Jackson when he entered the
Valley. Jackson saw the Shenendoah as the lifeline of the Confederacy. It was
the clearest path to Richmond from the North, contained many agricultural
products, and was the location of many train lines that fed the Confederate
troops. Crucial to understanding the importance of the Valley to Jackson were
the railroads. The B&O, W&P, and more importantly the Manassas Gap
Railroad all ran through some part of the valley [Appendix B]. Jackson
understood the parallel between victory on the rails and victory in the war.
The Manassas Gap Railroad can easily be called the ?meatline on the
Confederacy.?14 Along its tracks were found the largest meat packing plant in
the Confederacy and three depots of stores that fed the largest section of troops.
It was the most commonly used rail to transport newly arriving soldiers into the
army as well. In the spring of 1862, Union forces were closing in on the tracks,
and ?only such Confederates as Lee and Jackson understood the magnitude of
the loss.?15
Jackson also understood the importance that movement of supplies
played in the North. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was a ?regular target for
Jackson?s men who smashed its tracks and took its supplies.?16 It was one of
his cherished objectives to destroy that railroad and reclaim northwestern
Virginia.
During the entire campaign, Banks was receiving his supplies on the
Manassas Gap and then having them carted to him. ?Jackson reasoned that if
the road were cut at Front Royal, Banks would be forced to rely on a long wagon
haul from Winchester; that such a supply would be so vulnerable to cavalry
raids,?17 he could force Banks to fall back down the valley. He calculated that
by using the Massanuttens as a barrier he could swiftly take the rail at Front
Royal before Banks became aware of the purpose. He swept out of the woods,
and routed the Federal troops left to guard the railroad, leaving Banks cut off
from his supply line. Jackson?s recapture of the little town and railway spelled
disaster for Banks. He could now easily dispel Banks back to Winchester and
out of the Potomac completely. Clearly ?Stonewall Jackson knew how to use a
railroad? to escape victorious against larger foes.
On May 19th Jackson had began his valley campaign-a campaign that
resulted in brilliant success for the Southern cause. With the defeat of Fremont
on June 8th and Shields on 9th, he had been on march for 23 days; covered 200
miles; had McDowell?s? forces from Fredericksburg rerouted; had seized valuable
supplies at Front Royal, Winchester, and Martinsburg, and, although surrounded
by 60,000 men, had escaped the snares set for him and brought home prisoners
and captured goods. And he had done this with a comparatively small loss of
men. The Battle of Port Republic was his most costly victory, but its results were
so brilliant that it was a fitting close to a scene of warfare that will live in history
with the great campaigns of the world. It raised the fame of Jackson to the
highest pinnacle of military renown, giving him a position among the greatest
soldiers of the age.
The battles of Jackson?s Valley Campaign are known to students of the
war, not only in the United States, but across the world. General Norman
Shwarzkopf recently cited Jackson?s campaign as one of the guiding lights
behind his strategy in the Middle East. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel visited the
valley and followed in Jackson?s footsteps through the valley to understand the
genius behind it. The military skills which Stonewall Jackson used in the
Shenendoah Valley campaign have been analyzed and studied by war historians
for generations in hopes of repeating the brilliant execution.
Many future military leaders used Jackson as a basis for their command.
In England, from 1875 on, many officers were expected to read the
autobiography of Stonewall Jackson, with special emphasis on the Shenendoah
in order to learn ?a correct application of strategy of interior lines.?18 Erwin
Rommel, commander of the German forces in Africa, used the Valley Campaign
to learn to successfully defeat armies larger in size. Clearly, Stonewall
Jackson?s legacy in the valley lives on forever.
Jackson?s brilliance in the Shenendoah is directly linked to his
consummate understanding of the fact that to win in war is to understand the
movements of war. By marching his men under the nose of other commanders,
isolating smaller sections of armies that could easily be defeated, capitalizing on
railroads opportunities, understanding the necessary sections that the union
must travel to attack, and attacking the correct sections of the valley, Stonewall
had developed a military acumen that was unprecedented. In a matter of a short
time since enrollment into the Confederacy, Robert E. Lee and he were
controlling the fate of the war despite Federal advantages in industry, railroads,
men, and supplies. With Jackson?s death at Chancellorsville, many believe the
hopes of a southern victory died. Jackson had shown that military genius can
defeat superior numbers repeatedly, but the death of the consummate
commander caused the South to lose its greatest hope.
Historians and war experts agree that Jackson?s Valley campaign of 1862
is one of the greatest examples of military movement in history. However,
Jackson would not take credit for the brilliant upsets and victories saying simply,
?God has been our shield, and to his name be all the glory.?19