How, If At All, Does The Cogito Help To Ground Our Knowledge Securely? Essay, Research Paper
The Cogito is the name given to the famous statement Descartes
considers of which he is sure of its certainty: cogito, ergo sum, or ?I
think, therefore I am?. In the Meditations, Descartes actually uses ?I
think, I am?, but this is practically indistinguishable from the former, which
appears in Descartes? other main works. Descartes considers that the Cogito to
be indubitable, and that he is able to use it to ground his knowledge securely.
The Cogito, however, can be said not to be as wide or as useful as Descartes
considers it to be. Its apparent indubitably may be said to be one way of
securing some knowledge, but it is likely to be the case that the only
knowledge which is actually secured is that contained within the Cogito itself. As the Cogito is such a simple proposition to make, Descartes
himself commented that anybody could have written it. Its simplicity flows from
its clear self-evidence: when one reflects on the proposition, one is thinking,
and thus one can neither doubt that one is not thinking nor not existing (at
least as long as the proposition is being considered). For this reason, it can
be said to be very effective at securing knowledge of oneself: even if a
sceptic were to claim that the malicious demon could influence the mind as
well, Descartes could reply that even if he were to doubt that he exists, then
he will still be existing, because the act of thinking requires existence.
Moreover, as Descartes points out when he begins to contemplate the evil demon
hypothesis, for the deceiver to be effective, there would have to be someone to
deceive. The cogito can therefore withstand such criticisms: as a result, the
knowledge that his mental (i.e., his non-corporeal self) is secure. There has been much debate as to the way Descartes formulates
the cogito, and whether it is an inference or a proposition. Descartes himself
would say that that cogito is not reached by means of a syllogism. Such a
syllogism would take the form of: 1)
Everything that thinks exists. 2)
I think Thus 3) I am. Descartes is of the opinion that that the self-evidence of sum
is perceived, rather than be deduced from cogito. This seems to suggest that
the cogito is an unnecessary part of the proposition. Rather than the
realisation of thinking causing one to realise that one?s existence is not in
doubt, Descartes seems to be suggesting that the mind is automatically aware of
its own existence that it immediately grasps the truth of the entire statement.
This, though, makes the cogito redundant. The mind is just as able to grasp the
truth of ?I exist? without needing to consider whether it is thinking or not.
?I exist? is a self-verifying sentence: to deny it would be as absurd as to say
?I am currently absent?. Hintikka, though, suggests that these two words alone
do not necessarily make it true (an amusing example is offered of weighing
machines saying ?I speak your weight? ? it is not inferred from this that the
weighing machine is a conscious being), but that the cogito has a
?performatory? role in allowing the conclusion, ?I am ?, to be true for the
particular thinker. This makes the indubitable nature of the cogito perceived
not through the actual thinking, but because it is actively thought of.?? Williams suggested that Hintikka?s
suggestion of? ?performatory? role for
the cogito did not involve making the entire proposition true, but offering a
reason why ?I exist? cannot be doubted. In either interpretation, our knowledge
of ourselves can be suggested to be secured through the cogito. An important reason why the cogito cannot be considered a
syllogism is the common suggestion that, under the logical form set out above,
one could replace ?I think? with ?I walk?. This is pointed in the Objections,
although the response Descartes gives points out why ?I think? is the preferred
term. Descartes, at this stage in the Meditations, is unable to be
certain that he has a physical body: it is still open to doubt. Descartes,
though, suggests that one would have to say, ?I seem to be walking,? in order
for the proposition to be as certain as the earlier form. The use of the verb
?seem?, though, implies thought, thus this formation would be adding nothing
new to the original form of the cogito. Again, though, one can only be sure of
the fact that one is thinking and existing ? nothing more can be drawn from it.
Descartes is implying that the conclusion is intuitively known
from the premise, thus there is just one mental act which comprehends it all.
However, to say that one intuits one?s knowledge of one?s mental self, and then
infers from this that one exists, whilst denying that one flows from the other
(they are all understood immediately) seem to be contradictory. To say that by
thinking, one automatically recognises one?s existence i
I exist? is a conclusion to the syllogism described above. The only alternative
is to suggest that there is an innate knowledge of one?s existence inside
everyone, and that it reveals itself through mental processes: this, too,
whilst providing a secure base for knowledge does not avoid inferences. Part of the way the cogito achieves this degree of surety
regarding our knowledge is its reliance on the mind being transparent to the
individual. Descartes? method involves the need for introspection. Markie has
commented that, when one does this, one is not aware that one is thinking, but
rather that there is thought. With this alteration, one cannot infer, or be
certain, that one exists. Moreover, there are some thoughts and ideas about
ourselves that cannot be seized upon as easily as others, like emotions. This,
though, is an irrelevant argument: it is the fact that one can seem to be
having such-and-such a feeling, or can grasp some elementary ideas which the
introspection requires. Another flaw in the cogito is the actual definition of ?I
think?: Descartes does not specify what kinds of thoughts are covered by this
term. Descartes himself defines ? a thinking thing? as one that ?doubts,
understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and
has sensory perceptions?. It may presumed that Descartes considers this list to
be illustrative rather than definitive, as otherwise Descartes would be
drastically limiting the mind (albeit a finite mind). Williams rightly points
out that although this group of propositions about mental life may be
incorrigible, there are others (like emotions or being able to picture colours)
that are not. Moreover, subconscious or unconscious processes also have to be
taken into account. When one is in deep sleep[1],
one cannot be actively thinking, thus knowledge of one?s existence cannot have
any ground, even though parts of the brain are still active and processing
information (an example is the way the noise of fire alarms is able to be
interpreted by the brain and make it take the necessary action). Of course,
there is no certainty that one will ever wake up, but it can be argued that
grounds for one?s existence, based on the cogito, may still exist, albeit in a
way the conscious mind cannot access. This, though, is to misunderstand
Descartes. The proposition is only true, whilst it is being contemplated. For
that moment, he can be certain of his existence, and from this it can be
inferred that he is existing whilst his attention is on different things. For these reasons, Descartes is aware that there is a mysterious
?I? in the cogito, and that it can only work in the first person. ?He thinks,
therefore he exists?, is not as certain as its first person alternative. One
can say ?he doe not exist?, and have grounds for saying that. To refer to the
first person, though, makes its truth self-evident: it is inconsistent to say
such a thing. The reliance on the first person, though, shows that the cogito
can only prove that one exists, and is therefore not a secure ground for any
knowledge other than that. One may be certain that he exists, and the person
next to him may also be using the cogito to verify his existence. There is no
way both of them can be as certain of each other?s existence as they are of
their own. The cogito very quickly leads one to solipsism. Another problem with the cogito and its ability to securely
ground knowledge is the apparent contradiction in the Meditations
regarding what one can be certain of. Descartes maintains that he can only be
certain of things which he can clearly and distinctly perceive. Although he
never asserts that he clearly and distinctly perceives his ability to think,
and thus his existence, he says he is certain of it, which, following Descartes?
method, suggests that he does clearly and distinctly perceive it. But by the Third
Meditation this has been called in to doubt when he maintains that, prior
to assuring oneself of the existence of God, even clear and distinct
perceptions are open to manipulation by the malicious deceiver. Descartes
appears to be asserting that an atheist would therefore have nothing to rest
his own clear and distinct perception of his existence on, thus it would not be
certain. If Descartes himself is therefore taken as a guide, until one is
assured of the existence of God, even the cogito is in doubt, which means that
by his own standards he has not secured knowledge of himself. Even so, the cogito still does not securely ground knowledge. As
has been discussed, it merely secures a ground for knowing that the experiences
one has in one?s minds are in fact occurring in one?s mind. Nothing more can be
obtained from it, and so to claim that it is the basis of all knowledge and
certainty is fallacious. [1] By which is
meant the non-R.E.M, non-dreaming stages
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