Gorbachev: Analysis Of Three Books About Gorbachev Essay, Research Paper
Gorbachev: Analysis of Three Books About Gorbachev
The history of the Soviet Union is complicated and fascinating. In the course
of only seventy years this country has seen the development of the totally new
system of state, economic growth, the growth of hopes for the “brighter future”,
and then the sudden and expected by no one collapse of the whole system leading
to chaos, wars, and confusion. One period is especially important in order to
realize how did things finally started to change after the seventy years of
blindly pursuing the dream of communism which left the Soviet Union in a very
bad economical and moral state, and this period is called perestroika, Russian
for restructuring. The main figure behind this process which began in 1985 is
Mikhail S. Gorbachev who became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union Central Committee in March 1985. The three books that concentrate
on the “Gorbachev phenomenon” were all unfortunately written before perestroika
was finished, so they do not analyze the consequences that it had for the Soviet
Union as well as for the whole world . On the other hand, all three of these
books do a good job in explaining the changes that took place in the course of
the first three years after Gorbachev came to power and why were these changes
necessary.
The first book “Gorbachev” was written by Zhores A. Medvedev in 1986 and hence
the author is concentrating on the first year of the new course in Soviet
history. The book itself basically consists of two parts: the first part where
the author describes the “making of a General Secretary”, and the second part
entitled “Gorbachev in power” which describes Gorbachev’s first year in the
office. The first part of the book gives a lot of background information which
allows the reader to see the stages in development of the Soviet leader from
childhood and youth to second-in-command. One thing I found to be particularly
interesting in Medvedev’s description of Gorbachev’s youth and that is the
theory that living with a Czech intellectual for five years changed the future
Soviet leader in such a way that he became more “westernized” which “indirectly
provided the Soviet Union with a new style leader”. Medvedev says that during
the time from 1950 to 1955 when young Gorbachev attended the Moscow State
University and had to share the room with a Czech student Zdenek Mlynar he was
“profoundly influenced” by the “culture and attitudes of a traditionally Western
nation”. This influence lasted for years and the fact that Gorbachev has become
“westernized” in his appearance, manners, dress and the “image he projects of
tolerance and cordial behavior, all the small signs which mark him as different
from the usual Komsomol and Party boss”, is according to Medvedev due to a great
extent to the fact that Mlynar was Gorbachev’s roommate (Medvedev, 1986, p. 43).
Although the first part of the book is certainly interesting and important I
would like to concentrate on the second part of the book since it is directly
deals with the subject that interests me most, that is the years when Gorbachev
was in power and the development of the new course in the Soviet life called
perestroika. From just reading the first paragraph it is obvious that the
author approves of the new leader. Medvedev writes: “For the first time in
Soviet history, the leadership succession has meant more than the arrival of a
new leader and the possibility of the implementation of the new policies. The
Gorbachev succession marks the appearance of a new political generation which
differs from the old guard in style, knowledge and historical
vision….Gorbachev represents a younger post-war political generation, a
generation which started its professional Party or state career during the more
liberal Krushchev era” (p. 165). Medvedev quotes some of the very enthusiastic
Western newspaper comments which called Gorbachev a “bright, incisive, brisk-
mannered man”, with “high intelligence, considerable organizational abilities,
political acumen”. According to the author no previous Soviet leader had
received so much immediate publicity and such an enthusiastic welcome from the
general public. “Gorbachev’s popularity was closely linked to his energetic,
charismatic, competent and obviously intelligent personality”, says Medvedev
which led to this immediate acceptance of Gorbachev as leader (p. 183). Inspite
the fact that Gorbachev’s new style was popular, some of his methods found less
favor. A lot of his actions were purely administrative, imposed from above
without any discussion and seemed coercive and disciplinarian to some people,
especially to intellectuals who expected liberalism. Medvedev seems to justify
Gorbachev’s first decrees since they were “not designed to impress intellectuals,
but rather aimed at improving a sick economy” (p. 184).
It was very interesting to read about the “battle against the bottle” which
Gorbachev started immediately. For him vodka was a “public enemy number one”,
the cause of increasing crime, poor productivity, an increasing number of
problem children of alcoholic parents, reduced life expectancy and alcohol-
related health problems, all of which created a heavy burden on the national
economy. Some of the measures that were taken by the government were increasing
the drinking age from 18 to 21, alcohol could no longer be sold in ordinary food
stores, special wine shops would not be permitted to sell any alcohol before 2
PM, stiff sentences were introduced for private stills. But the anti-alcohol
campaign quickly has became unpopular and “has created a degree of social
tension” which led to the canceling of the whole campaign by the government (p.
189). During his first year Gorbachev made some big changes in the agricultural
sector of the Soviet Union. The decision was made to allocate annually from one
million to one million two hundred thousand allotments to citizens. Medvedev
sees this decision as “Gorbachev’s second personal initiative which had a real
practical and positive impact on the quality of people’s lives. The garden co-
operatives reduced the pressure slightly on state retail sales of vegetables and
fruit, particularly in small towns” (p. 201).
As for the domestic policy, according to Medvedev, Gorbachev’s first year in
power was marked by “unprecedently large changes in the personnel of the
Politburo and government and the rapid formulation of economic targets and
methods of economic development for the next 15 years. In all other respects,
however, the changes in domestic policy were merely cosmetic” (p. 208). Policies
were better presented, the style was more modern, but there was little in the
contents. Gorbachev has introduced very few social and political changes in his
first year in office. Medvedev argues that this was due to the fact that
Gorbachev, as a professional Party official understood that liberalization or
democratization may turn against him (which is exactly how everything worked out
some five years later, but of course Medvedev did not know this for sure back in
1986). Also Gorbachev’s new team had absolutely no desire to make the system
more liberal. In the last chapter Medvedev talks about Soviet new diplomacy
which was created by Gorbachev in his first year in the office. First of all,
Gorbachev’s charm, sense of humor, prompt responses, attempts to find convincing
arguments “suddenly introduced the human factor into East-West confrontation
which in itself served to reduce tension. Gorbachev clearly did not resemble a
person who was waiting for the opportunity to drop a nuclear bomb on the West”
(p. 228). For Gorbachev two main issues were the problem of the arms race and
Afghanistan, where the war had gone for two long and there was no end in sight.
Gorbachev wanted to accelerate economic development and the main task of his
diplomacy was the reduction of the cost of the foreign policy and that meant
substantial arms reductions. In his book Medvedev makes an assumption that the
Soviet government would not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Gorbachev
will be aiming for a “quick military end to the war” – assumption that proved to
be wrong . On the other hand the author is right when he predicts the gradual
thawing of the Soviet-US relations, thawing that started in Geneva with Reagan-
Gorbachev negotiations and continued throughout Gorbachev’s rule. In his
conclusion Medvedev makes a statement that “it has been abundantly clear that
Gorbachev is neither a liberal nor a bold reformist. He prefers small
modifications, administrative methods and economic adjustments to structural
reform … it is a mistake to expect too much from Gorbachev” (p. 245). This
statement, as we all know, quickly proved to be wrong. The second book titled
“The Gorbachev Phenomenon” was written by Moshe Lewin in 1988, two years after
Medvedev published his work and therefore it gives the reader a better
perspective on what happened while Gorbachev was in power. Lewin’s book is
structured very similar to the first book that I described above. It also
consists of the two parts: one deals with the history of the Soviet Union before
1985, and the second part, entitled “The New Course” discusses the changes that
took place in the country after Gorbachev became the General Secretary. Right
from the start the author says that the Soviet Union is on the “verge of
important changes in the way it conducts its affairs, maybe in the way it is run
… Russia is now entering a crucial new stage and is therefore, in many
respects, just a beginner” (Lewin, 1988, p. 1). Lewin follows Medvedev’s steps
in describing the new Soviet leader and uses all kinds of approving terms such
as “bright”, “intelligent” and “incisive”. But unlike Medvedev Lewin makes an
argument that the main reason for perestroika was not the individualism of
Gorbachev but rather the crisis that had been created by the mechanisms of
economic management that had emerged in the 1930’s and were still powerful. He
also talks about the enormous role of the people who were “placing pressure on
the governing model, insisting that each sphere of action receive the attention
it needed and that new institutions and new methods be created to serve the new
social forms. The system needed to loosen up” (p. 112). The answer to people’s
pressure Gorbachev began his new line which was characterized by an appeal for
frankness. The leaders were ready to face the truth and report to the country
that the system was in a bad shape. This was particularly true about the
economy. As the Party Congress put it : “The production relations that exist
currently, the system of husbanding and managing, emerged, in substance, in
conditions of extensive economic development. Gradually they became obsolete,
lost their stimulating power and turned, in many ways, into a hindrance” (p.
115). This new line did not stop with criticisms of the management of the
economy. Ideology and ideological life were also described as being in shambles.
The leaders admitted that Soviet people did not believe official statements and
ideological dogma was a powerful obstacle to the country’s development. This
was the beginning of the new page in the history of the Soviet Union which
became known all over the world as glasnost.
Together with the appeal for glasnost – a slogan but also a pledge to ease
censorship and facilitate the access to information – there was a call for
uskorenie, a “speeding up of the pace of economic development
technological progress”. Lewin can not comprehend how some Western observers
can still claim that nothing really happens, that “there is no well-defined
program, notably for economic reforms”. Such statements are “sheer obstinacy”,
according to the author since ideas for change are being debated, implemented,
and tested. And the fact that no comprehensive program has been announced seems
rather as a good sign to Lewin, since “for what single program could fill the
bill?” (p. 116-117).
As against Medvedev, Lewin does not spend much time describing “the battle
against the bottle”. He sums everything up in one sentence instead of two
chapters and has a different view of the successfulness of this initiative:
“Although many predicted failure, the government stuck to its guns, gained
public support for its aims and the anti-drinking campaign has achieved some
success. This was clever and promising opening” (p. 116).
Lewin’s conclusions about the changes in the agricultural sector and foreign
policy are very similar to that of Medvedev. The author talks about how the
center would ease its control, how government would give more freedom in the
choices that people involved in producing the agricultural goods can have.
Lewin underlined the importance of Gorbachev’s decision to allocate allotments
which led to the bigger interest of the Soviet people in working the land which
ultimately led to the increase in agricultural production. Lewin also mentions
the better Russian-American relations which was due to the fact that Gorbachev
was ready for discussions with the American president and has chosen such
international policy that led to the slowing down of the arms race and the
reduction of the accumulation of arms.
As for the domestic policy Lewin has a different position than Medvedev, this is
due to a large extent to the fact that Lewin is writing his work two years after
Medvedev. “Glasnost, democratization, self-government in the workplace,
orientation to the social sphere, social justice, human rights, and respect for
human individuality” – reforms in these areas took place after three years of
Gorbachev in power and influenced domestic policy a lot according to Lewin (p.
119). At the very end of the book Lewin makes a statement that proved to be so
true after the couple of years since this work was published. “The old system
is still in place and its supporters, deeply disturbed by the perestroika, will
certainly resist change. The reformers are not assured of victory: they will
have to fight hard for it, go for bold new moves. Their failure would be
terribly costly for the USSR and could well produce negative repercussions
worldwide. The world is now watching Moscow attentively and with good reason”
(p. 153). It is hard to believe that these words were written eight years
ago….
The third book is probably the most important one since it is the work of the
man who is directly responsible for the changes that took place in the Soviet
Union and who is also responsible, although indirectly, for the changes that
took place in the whole Eastern Europe. Gorbachev wrote a book entitled
“Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World” back in 1987, two
years after he became the new Soviet leader. In this book the author tries to
answer the question of what is perestroika? Why does the Soviet society need it?
What are its substance and objectives? What does it reject and what does it
create? How is it proceeding and what might be its consequences for the Soviet
Union and the world community? In other words, all the questions that were
raised and discussed by Medvedev and Lewin but answered by the originator.
Perestroika, according to Gorbachev, is an “urgent necessity arising from the
profound processes of development in our socialist society. This society is
ripe for change. It has been long yearning for it” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 17).
Perestroika was caused by all sorts of problems that the Soviet Union had
accumulated over the seventy years. First factor was a slowing economic growth
which caused “a country that was once quickly closing on the world’s advanced
nations began to lose one position after another”. At the same time the gap in
the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological
development … began to widen, and not to our advantage”. All this eventually
led to an economic deadlock and stagnation that paralyzed Soviet society.
Declining rates of growth affected other aspects of the Soviet life, for
instance the social sphere, which began to lag behind other spheres in terms of
technological development, personnel, know-how and quality of work. Gorbachev
also mentions a gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of Soviet
people as another argument for the need of restructuring. People did not
believe in the government because of the many promises that it made and never
accomplished; because the needs and opinions of ordinary working people, of the
public at large, were ignored. There was a process of decay in public morals;
“the great feeling of solidarity with each other that was forged during the
heroic times of the Revolution, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic
War and postwar rehabilitation was weakening” (p. 21-22). Gorbachev also talks
about alcoholism, drug addiction and culture alien to Soviet people, which “bred
vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological bareness”. This
statement about “alien to us” culture reminded me of how this fight against
“degeneration” which American movies and other media brings was carried out -
how people were hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how it would be almost
impossible to get a videotape with an American movie but people would still
manage to get it “through a friend of a friend” and then watch it, which as
Gorbachev puts it “bred vulgarity and low tastes”. Considering all the problems
the government made “the only logical conclusion” that the country was verging
on crisis. This conclusion was announced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of
the Central Committee, “which inaugurated the new strategy of perestroika and
formulated its basic principles” (p. 24). Gorbachev gives a plan of perestroika,
its component parts which include: overcoming the stagnation process, breaking
down the braking mechanism. It means mass initiative. “It is the comprehensive
development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative,
improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all spheres of the
society; respect for the individual”. Perestroika is also the intensification of
the Soviet economy, development of the principles of democratic centralism and
encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also means “the elimination from
society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the principles
of social justice. It means the unity of words and deeds, rights and duties”.
But Gorbachev does not forget to include Lenin and says that “the essence of
perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives
the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice”
(p.34-35).
Gorbachev also gives his evaluation of perestroika. He is writing this book two
and a half years after the new line was launched and his assessment is as
follows: “perestroika is just getting of the ground. So far we have only been
shaping the mechanisms of acceleration” (p. 64). The real work for him is still
ahead and the main task is to get the whole society involved in the process of
restructuring.
In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about “new political
thinking”, new Soviet foreign policy which should benefit international
relations, especially Soviet-American relations and provide for “nuclear-free,
non-violent world”. The main task of the Soviet foreign policy is to move “from
suspicion and hostility to confidence, from a balance of fear to a balance of
reason and goodwill, from narrow nationalist egoism to cooperation” (p. 254).
Gorbachev feels that the not only the Soviet Union but the whole world needs
restructuring, a fundamental change – this, of course, does not come as a
surprise, if we remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks and than communists
wanted to make this “fundamental change”.
The three books that were discussed above were all written by different authors
and in different times but still basically they all have the same approach.
Medvedev and Lewin both approve the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all
kinds of good adjectives to describe him such as “bright” and “intelligent”.
They both are optimistic about the future of the country although make it clear
that this is only a beginning of the story to follow and since the perestroika
just started at the time they were writing their works they can only speculate
about what would happen to the country. As for Gorbachev he is probably the
most optimistic about the new line which is not surprising since he is the
leader and leaders should radiate with confidence. He is also the best source
for finding out what perestroika is all about, its goals and its origins. Of
course now in 1996 many of his statements sound unfounded, even funny but when
we read his work we have to keep in mind that back in 1985 Gorbachev’s ideas
sounded new and revolutionary, destined to change the Soviet Union and even the
whole world – which did in fact happen.
The question whether Gorbachev’s perestroika was a failure or a success does not
have an easy immediate answer. Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted
from 1985 to 1990 caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the country
on the verge of crisis, with economy in chaos and no certain future. Joan E.
Spero, the author of the book “The Politics Of International Economic Relations”,
is the supporter of this point of view. In the chapter entitled “The Failure
of Perestroika” she shows by using different examples, such as economical
progress, stability of the country and so on, that Gorbachev failed to achive
the objectives of perestroika (Spero, 1996, p336). Although I agree that
Gorbachev did not achieve some of the goals stated in his book “Perestroika”, I
believe that perestroka was a success to a certain extent. First of all, he did
achieve some of the objectives. For instance, after the reforms the society did
become more open thanks to glasnost. People for the first time since 1917 could
say what they really thought and not what was “good for the party”. People also
gained access to all sorts of information which was previously denied to them.
Children in schools and students in colleges could finally learn the history as
it was and not as it was seen by the Communist party. Another major success of
perestroika was the increasing openness of the country to the West which led to
a considerable improvements in East-West relations. This also led to the
gradual reduction of arms and considerable decline in defense spending in the
Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Considering these and other
positive results of perestroika I would have to disagree with those people who
say that it was a complete failure. The restructuring that took place in the
Soviet Union has many dimensions – some are positive, some are negative. One-
sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars advocate is not correct, since
it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, completely ignoring
all the positive effects that it had.
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