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The Architectonic Form Of Kant

’s Copernican System Essay, Research Paper


The Architectonic Form of Kant’s Copernican System


Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our


knowledge as belonging to a possible system. [Kt1:502]


1. The Copernican Turn


The previous chapter provided not only concrete evidence that Kant’s


System is based on the principle of perspective [II.2-3], but also a general


outline of its perspectival structure [II.4]. The task this sets for the


interpreter is to establish in greater detail the extent to which the System


actually does unfold according to this pattern. This will be undertaken


primarily in Parts Two and Three. But before concluding Part One, it will


be helpful to examine in more detail the logical structure of the relationships


between the various parts of Kant’s System, and how they fit together to


compose what we have called Kant’s ‘Copernican Perspective’.


Kant rather boldly compares the contribution made to philosophy by


Kt1 with that which Copernicus made to astronomy. Copernicus explained


‘the movements of heavenly bodies’ (i.e., of the planets, stars and sun) by


denying ‘that they all revolved round the spectator’ (i.e., the earth), as they


indeed appear to do, and suggesting instead that the earth and other planets


revolve around the sun while the stars remain at rest. Likewise, Kant


attempts to explain our knowledge of objects in general by denying ‘that all


our knowledge must conform to objects’, as it indeed appears to do, and


suggesting instead ‘that objects must conform to our knowledge’ [Kt1:xvi;


cf. Kt65:83]. This metaphor, expressing the difference between appearance


and reality in the theories of both Copernicus and Kant, suggests the


following two models:


(a) Appearance (b) Reality


Figure III.1: The Two Aspects of a Copernican Revolution


These diagrams can be used to represent Kant’s Copernican revolution


simply by replacing ‘earth’ with ’subject’ and ’sun’ with ‘object’, and by


stipulating that motion represents the active, determining factor in


knowledge, while rest represents the passive factor. As a result, (a) would


depict the ordinary person’s (as such, quite legitimate) Empirical


Perspective on the world, while (b) would depict the philosopher’s special


Transcendental Perspective.


The ‘change in perspective’ [Kt1:xxii] required by the philosopher’s


switch from (a) to (b) is the revolutionary ‘touchstone’ of Kant’s entire


System [see II.1], for it reveals th

at ‘we can know a priori of things only


what we ourselves put into them’ [xviii]. The philosopher’s primary


attention, therefore, is directed away from the objects of knowledge and is


focused instead on the subject (i.e., on humanity) and our mental activities.


On this point, at least, there is widespread agreement among interpreters.


Kant’s Copernican revolution has been said to consist, for example, in


claims such as these:


human knowledge can only be understood if we hypothesize the activities of


the knower [C3:237];


the epistemological conditions for knowing natural entities are at the


same time the ontological conditions for their existence as such [i.e.,


empirically] [Y2:977];


the universality and necessity of synthetic a priori propositions as


established by … critical argumentation are … specifically relativized to the


workings of the human intellect [R4:318; cf. 321];


the objects of human knowledge can only be legitimately [described] …


if they are ‘considered’ in relation to the human mind and its conceptual


scheme.1


Unfortunately, the agreement among Kant-scholars on general matters


such as this does not carry over into matters of detailed interpretation or


critical evaluation. Indeed, inasmuch as Kant never provides a thorough and


consistent explanation of the logical relationships between the many


constitutive ‘elements’ in his three Critiques–such as those in Kt1


concerning knowledge, which he discusses in the Transcendental Doctrine


of Elements,2 there will probably never be widespread agreement


concerning their intended meanings and relative importance. But in spite of


the negative answer which the consensus of two centuries of interpretive


scholarship has given to the question of the unity of Kant’s System [cf.


I.1], it seems incongruous to regard Kant as a ‘megaphilosopher’ and yet to


confess that he failed in so basic a task. I shall therefore attempt in this


chapter to reveal the architectonic unity of his entire System by providing an


outline of its formal structure. My underlying goal will be to set the stage


for an analysis of the content, and thus of the detailed arguments, of the


three Critical systems [see Part Three]–one which could serve not only to


facilitate more widespread agreement among interpreters, but also to help us


understand why Kant believed his ‘critical philosophy opens up the


prospect of permanent peace among philosophers’ [Kt33:416(288); see


XII.3-4].


36b

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