’re Out Essay, Research Paper
Running head: THREE STRIKES
Three Strikes and You’re Out
Kelly Jay Stewart
CRIM 440
21 November 2000
Three Strikes and You’re Out
Samuel Walker, author of Sense and Nonsense about Crime
and Drugs, presented us in his book with forty-eight
propositions that dealt with crime, drugs, and our efforts
toward getting rid of these problems. A few of these
propositions informed us on positive actions taking place in
our criminal justice system, but the majority of them told
us what was not working to fight crime and drugs. One of
those propositions that was a negative aspect of our justice
system today in Mr. Walker’s eyes was the “three strikes and
you’re out” laws (referred to here after as three strikes
laws). He gives numerous reasons why this law is not
considered to be an effective one. This paper will first
explain Walker’s view on the issue and then review some of
the current research and opinions on the matter.
Samuel Walker conducted very thorough research on the
propositions he presented to us in his book. His twentieth
proposition read as follows; “ ‘Three strikes and you’re
out’ laws are a terrible crime policy” (Walker, 1998: 140).
Walker justifies his claim by asking and then explaining
three questions. The first question is whether the law
would actually be implemented. Walker states that “hardly
any states were using there three strikes laws” (Walker,
1998: 138). California is leading the nation in
prosecutions of offenders through the current two and three
strikes laws (Tischler, 1999). Fifteen of the twenty-three
states that have three strikes laws have incarcerated
between zero and six inmates since 1993 according to The
Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy (Tischler, 1999).
The second reason Walker cites is the impact of the
three strikes laws on the criminal justice system. These
laws are affecting the system by overcrowding prisons,
subjecting criminals to excessive prison terms, and costing
society entirely too much money (Walker, 1998). The three
strikes law in California stipulates that your first two
“strikes” are acquired when you commit two serious or
violent felonies. However the third strike can be any type
of felony, violent or nonviolent (Schafer, 1999). For this
reason, more and more criminals are being put away,
especially in California, for third strikes that are
nonviolent and relatively small crimes and overcrowding our
prisons at a fast rate.
In 1996, males under the age of twenty-five accounted
for forty-five percent of the individuals arrested for index
crimes (Schafer, 1999). This raises questions for skeptics
of three strikes laws. Why incarcerate offenders for life
when their criminal tendencies statistically drop after a
certain age? These opponents assert that three strikes laws
subject offenders to over-incarceration. This leads to the
next issue concerning money. Burr states in his study
comparing the impact of the three strikes law in California
to the impact in Canada that “over-incarceration does not
serve the interest of justice or the interests of the
taxpayer” (2000: 5). Walker estimates that if California
were to implement the new law to the full extent for the
next twenty-five years, the state would have to pay an extra
$5.5 billion (1998). A significant piece of this estimate
would be funding the incarceration of elderly prisoners who
require more funds to maintain (Walker, 1998).
The third reason Walker uses to support his proposition
is that the law will not reduce crime (1998). He supports
this claim by stating that there is no evidence that crime
has been reduced by these laws and that the law is not
consistently enforced (1998). Burr affirms this statement
in his own study by stating that “no study has demonstrated
that the three strikes law has reduced violence” (2000). As
stated earlier, the three strikes law has not been
administered by all the states that currently have it
either. By 1997, twenty-four states and the federal
government had adopted some form of three strikes mandatory
sentencing laws (Schafer, 1999). Walker suggests as well
that three strikes laws are nothing new and that “most
states have had some kind of habitual offender law for many
decades” (1998).
There are two additional considerations that have been
documented supporting Walker’s claim that three strikes is a
“terrible crime policy.” The first is that it has forced
more criminals both underground and to become more violent.
Dannie Martin, an ex-convict with seven prior felonies on
his record, now a novel writer suggests through his
observations that this new law has only forced criminals to
work underground (1995). They are more often working alone
as well and created a “nothing-left-to-lose mentality” among
criminals making them even more violent (1995: 2). “If a
robber has two priors, a murder and an arson is no different
to him than a robbery” (1995: 2). Schafer found that
fifty-four percent of offenders responding to a survey he
conducted responded that they “would kill witnesses or law
enforcement officers to avoid a life sentence” (1999: 10)
Criminals believe that if they are going to have a mandatory
sentence of life imposed on them they might as well go one
step further.
The other concern is the racial disparity that is
seemingly spawning from this new law. Walker briefly
addresses this issue stating that “African-Americans were
being sent to prison thirteen times as often under the law
as were whites” (1998: 140). Tischler affirms this
statistic stating that “44 percent of those convicted under
three strikes laws are black” (1999: 1).
Along with the supporting materials to Walker’s
argument there is also opposing views that say that three
strikes laws are working. The fir
of three strikes laws. Any way you look at it, the crime
rate in California since the adoption of this law in March
of 1994 has significantly decreased (Schafer, 1999). There
is a wide range of percentages that are given to represent
this decrease. One of the more conservative statistics
quotes a 26.9% decrease, or 815,000 crimes, since 1994
(Schafer, 1999). Schafer presents his deterrent argument
stating that “[i]n the year prior to the law’s passage,
California’s population of paroled felons increased by
226….In the year after the law’s enactment, the number of
paroled felons plunged as 1,335 moved out of California”
(1999: 7).
Schafer conducted a survey of offenders to measure the
specific and general deterrence affects, if any. The survey
found that seventy-eight percent of those surveyed
understood the concept of the three strikes law. Schafer
found that “seventy percent said they would not or probably
would not commit the crime if they knew they would receive
life in prison, thus demonstrating a specific deterrent
effect” (1999: 9). When asked a similar question that
focused on general deterrence, that number dropped to forty
percent, illustrating a weaker effect (1999: 9). While
Schafer suggests that more studies similar to this one
should be conducted in other states, this serves as a good
starting point for assessing the deterrence effect. Schafer
concludes that three strikes laws should be addressed to
offenders in specific terms to maximize the deterrent
effect.
The second opposing view to Walker’s proposition is
Secretary of State Bill Jones’ report outlining the effects
of the law. Bill Jones is the author of the now famous
three strikes law. His report, more than likely a little
exaggerated, announces a thirty-eight percent decline in
violent crime since the passage of the three strikes law
(Wood, 1999). He also estimates that approximately one
million crimes have been prevented and $21.7 billion in
costs associated to those crimes have been saved (Wood,
1999). He recognizes, however, that the decrease in crime
is not solely attributed to the three strikes law but that
is definitely is “not accidental” (Wood, 1999: 2). His
report has obvious flaws but is certainly something to
consider when discussing the effectiveness of this law.
One interesting look at the impact of the three strikes
law is to view it from the eyes of the actual offender. In
Martin’s article A View from the Underworld: Life After
three Strikes, he tells of a friend of his that has a few
prior convictions but is out of prison at the time. After
trying to reach him by phone and being unsuccessful, he
catches up with him sometime later. He learns that his
phone was turned off and done so on purpose. Martin’s
friend explains it as so: “I’m afraid that someone will
call and ask me for a lawnmower part and a narcotics
detective will get on the stand and say that ‘lawnmower’
part was really cocaine or heroin and I’m gone” (Martin,
1995: 2). This may serve as an example of how some
criminals that roam the streets feel about the three strikes
law. If they have two prior convictions, it will not take
much to get that third, leaving them on thin ice.
The three strikes law seems to have more going against
it than for it at the present time. One major problem is
that it is not enforced everywhere it is available and when
enforced, it is not done so consistently. However, if this
law were to be enforced as it were designed, it would have a
profound effect on our crime statistics in a good way. One
way to possibly confront the problem of prison overcrowding
and financial burden would be the establishment of a release
age wherein that criminals subjected to this law would be
released after such a time. With all the research on the
crime rates of certain ages, there is bound to be an age
where offenders could be released with the confident
assumption that they will not commit again. Three strikes
laws originated from a reasonable assumption; those that
have committed three felonies will probably commit again.
This law should stressed harder rather than abolished.
References
Burr, G., Wong, S., Veen, S. & Gu, D. (2000, June). Three
strikes and you’re out: An investigation of false positive
rates using a Canadian sample. Federal Probation, 64,
3-7.
Martin, D. (1995, September 13). A view from the underworld:
Life after three strikes. Available: http://www.
pacificnews. org/jinn/stories/columns/voices/950913-
three-strikes.html
Schafer, J. (1999, April). The deterrent effect of three
strikes law. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 68, 6-11.
Tischler, E. (1999, Feburary). Three strikes striking out?
Corrections Today, 61, 19.
Walker, S. (1998). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs:
A policy guide. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Wood, D. (1999, March 8). The impact of ‘three strikes’
laws. Christian Science Monitor, 91, 1-5.
Bibliography
References
Burr, G., Wong, S., Veen, S. & Gu, D. (2000, June). Three
strikes and you’re out: An investigation of false positive
rates using a Canadian sample. Federal Probation, 64,
3-7.
Martin, D. (1995, September 13). A view from the underworld:
Life after three strikes. Available: http://www.
pacificnews. org/jinn/stories/columns/voices/950913-
three-strikes.html
Schafer, J. (1999, April). The deterrent effect of three
strikes law. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 68, 6-11.
Tischler, E. (1999, Feburary). Three strikes striking out?
Corrections Today, 61, 19.
Walker, S. (1998). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs:
A policy guide. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Wood, D. (1999, March 8). The impact of ‘three strikes’
laws. Christian Science Monitor, 91, 1-5.