Egypt-Israeli Conflict And The West- Essay, Research Paper
Egypt-Israeli Conflict and the West-
The History of the conflict in the Middle East is long and
well documented. To both, and to many biased observers the history
of the Egyptian/Israeli conflict is very one sided, with one
government, or one people causing the continued wars between the
two neighboring states. But, as any social scientist of any reputation
will state, all international conflicts have more than one side, and
usually are the result of events surrounding, and extending over the
parties involved. Thus, using this theory as a basis, we must assume
that the conflict between Israel and Egypt is more complicated than a
partial observer would see it. For the purpose of this paper, we are
going to examine the basic factors of Egypt’s Involvement and conflict
with Israel, with some emphasis on the involvement of the United
State, and the Western Nation in this conflict. Also, I wish to pay
particular attention to the question of who, or what brought these
countries into conflict. Were they both victims of their situation, or
did they become actively involved in promoting conflict, or perhaps a
third party source, such as the US pushed them into conflict?
In 1948, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
Israel was read by David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv. The Egyptians, like
most of the Arab states saw this as a creation of a Western State,
backed by the British Empire, and thus an imperialistic entity in the
Arab homeland. Considering the past 20 years of the Egyptian state,
and of most of the Arab nations, was a continual conflict again
imperial powers, the Egyptian were naturally weary and afraid of any
new imperialistic powers developing in the Middle East. In September
1947, the League of Arab States decided to resist by force the plan
for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State, and
when the Jewish state was created, the armies of the various Arab
states entered into Palestine to save the country for the Arabs again
“Zionist” aggression. The Arabs were defeated and the Arab Countries
saved a small amount of land, the Transjordon, and the West Bank.
Similarly Egypt saved strip of territory around Gaza.
The causes of this war, and Egypt’s involved can be examined
in several ways. Obviously, the creation of the State of Israel by
Ben-Gurion and his supporters provided a excuse for the Arab Nations,
and Egypt to attack the Jewish population in Israel. As mentioned, the
Egyptians saw the formation of Israel as an Imperialist state, and
they were defending the land for the Palestinians, and more
importantly for the newly developing arab unity. While the United
States was not actively involved in the war, either by providing arms
or providing much assistance, their actions did create an interesting
and volatile atmosphere. As soon as the state of Israel was created,
the United State quickly recognized the state and started diplomatic
relations with the newly formed government. At the same time, the USSR
recognized Israel, not wishing the US to be seen as the champion for
the newly found state. Although there is no definitive proof, one can
assume that Egypt, and the rest of the Arab nations felt the need to
quickly react to the situation, in almost a type of fear that powers
outside their Arab influence, such as the United States were quickly
impeding on their territory, by using Israel as a means of their
peaceful aggression.
Still, Egypt was clearly the main aggressor in this instance,
and was not defending their own territory, but instead attempting to
obtain territory, which they did succeed in acquiring, through the
Gaza Strip. The Egyptian actions quickly set the tone of conflict in
the Middle East, giving the Israelis no option but the take an initial
purely military response in defense of their newly formed state. In
the minds of the Israeli leaders, Egypt was nothing but a threat to
the existence of the Jewish state, and thus, perhaps rightly, should
only be dealt with as an enemy.
From the outcome of this poorly prepared war emerged Gamal
Abdul Nasser, who commanded an Egyptian Army in Palestine. He
organized a clandestine group inside the army called the Free
Officers. After the war against Israel, the Free Officers began to
plan for a revolutionary overthrow of the government. In 1949 nine of
the Free Officers formed the Committee of the Free officers’ Movement
and in 1950 Nasser was elected chairman. In 1952, the Free Officers
Movement led a revolution in Egypt and took power, under the newly
formed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) , with Muhammad Naguib as
president and commander in Chief. Almost all leader in the RCC were
soldiers, many who had fought in the 1948 war and this seriously
affected the outlook of them towards Israel, and their policies
towards Israel as a state. Most of them had some type of conflicts
with the British and were totally, and completely against colonial
power in the Middle East, of any kind.
While Naguib was the head of the RCC and the government,
Nasser was the real power behind Egypt. Although the first 2 years of
the RCC’s existence was a struggle of power, Nasser eventually won,
and the Egyptian foreign policy was dictated by him. Within a few
months Naguib officially began prime minister, minister of war,
commander in chief and the president of the RCC. Interestingly enough,
Nasser took no direct actions during the next few years against
Israel, but instead focused on internal colonization, by trying to get
the British out.
It should be mentioned that around this time, the great
contracts against the USSR were formed and implemented. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Treaty organization
were supposed to contain the Soviet Union in the west and east. The
Baghdad pact, brought Britain, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq to form
a barrier on the USSR’s south borders. It seems that Nasser failed to
see this importance, even when Britain initially refused to talk about
leaving Egypt until Nasser agreed to an alliance. This decision
affected him later, when he sough foreign aid.The United States seeing
the growing cold war conflict in this region sought to use the
conflict between Israel & Egypt to its advantage. While they didn’t
wish to offend either side, at the time, they couldn’t yet pledge
allegiance to either side.
When in 1955, after the British had agree to eventually leave
the Canal Area, Nasser started to become convinced once again that
Egypt had to arm to defend itself against Israel. Still, the first
attack in 1955 was Israel, when they attacked Egyptian Military
outposts in Gaza. Quickly, realizing his possible situation, Nasser
sought western aid only to find that neither the U.S., France or
Britain was willing to help. Because Nasser had refused to join an
anti-USSR alliance, he was seen as a threat, especially by people such
as the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Nasser, then turned to
the USSR and accepted soviet weapons, which put them directly against
the western push for influence in the Middle East. This decision
effected Nasser influence on the Western powers for it made sure than
in later years that Israel, and not Egypt would get assistance from
the United States or Britain. Yet, they he had no choice, except to
arm himself in this manner.
In Secret Britain, the United States and Israel agreed to
allow Israel to attack the Canal from across the Sinai Desert. When
Israel neared the canal, Britain and France would issue an ultimatum
for an Egpytian and Israeli withdrawal from both sides of the Canal,
and Anglo-French force would then occupy the canal and prevent further
fighting, and keep in open for shipping. Israel did not agree to this
plan, unless first Britain and France agreed to destroy the Egyptian
Air Force. British Bombing did destroy the Egyptian Airforce and
Israel occupied Sinai. The United States was angered because it had
not been informed by its allies of the invasion, and realized that it
could not allow the Soviet Union to appear as the champion of the
Third World against Western Imperialism. Thus, the US put pressure on
the British and French to withdraw.
While France and Britain withdrew, Israel was very reluctant.
Eisenhower placed a great deal of pressure on Israel with withdraw
from all of its territorial acquisitions, and even threatened
sanctions if Israel did not comply. The Israelis did withdraw, but
carried out a scorched earth policy destroying everything they passed.
For the first time in a while, Egypt saw the United States as a
possible friend to their cause, and realized that the US would not
always support Israel. Nasser began to look at the United States as a
possible ally against Israel, if his connections with the USSR failed,
and saw the possible opportunity of gaining this through the
superpower conflict. Similarly, Nasser realized that his new found
status as the champion of the Arab nations against the Imperial powers
made him a more powerful figure than before.
During the mid-1960’s the Tension between Israel and Egypt
increased. In November 1966, Egypt signed a 5 year defense pact, and
Israeli forces crossed into the West Bank of Jordan and destroyed the
village of As Samu. IN 1967 Israeli leaders threatened to invade
Syria, and serious Air Battle Begain. Soon after, Egypt attacked place
troops on the border, but did not strike (although Nasser’s commanders
urged him to). Then, when in June 5, Israel launched a full-scale
attack and defeated all of Egypt’s forces within 3 hours.
After the 1967 war, the first move of the Arabs was to hold a
summit in Khartoum in September 1967. At that meeting, Saudi Arabia
agreed to give Egypt the financial aid needed to rebuild its army and
retake land lost to Israel. At this conference the Arab leaders were
united in their opposition of Israel and proclaimed what became known
as the three “no’s” of the Khartoum summit: no peace with Israel, no
negotiations, no recognition.
At the UN in November, the Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 242 which provided the framework for the settlement
of the June 1967 War. This resolution called for Israel to withdraw
“from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, for the
termination of the state of belligerency and for the right of ALL
states to exist in that region. In 1968 Egypt agreed to accept the
resolution if Israel agreed to evacuate all occupied areas. By
accepting this agreement, for the first time Egypt recognized the
State of Israel. The rest of the Arab nations, not agreeing with this
plan, saw the Egyptian government as being a sell out. Sadly, Israel
rejected the agreement, and Nasser believed that since Israel refused
to support resolution 242, while Egypt accepted it, he had no choice
“but to support courageous resistance fighters who wa
their land.” Thus, the “War of Attrition” broke out, where Egypt
attacked, through artillery Israeli forced dug along the canal. The
result was Israeli air response which virtually destroyed the Egyptian
Artillery.
During this time, the Israeli Military was supplied by the
Nixon Administration, because it supposedly regarded Israel as a
bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area. Nassar, seeing that his
chances were few, flew to Moscow and asked the Soviet Union to
establish an air defense system manned by Soviet pilots and
anti-aircraft forces protected by Soviet troops. To obtain this aid,
Nassar agree to grant the Soviet Union control over a number of
Egyptian airfields as well as operational control over a large portion
of the Egyptian. Although recent and possibly future analysis may see
otherwise, it currently seems that the Soviet Union took a calculated
risk of possible superpower confrontation over the Middle East. It
seemed possible at the time, that the two superpowers were using these
two countries as pawns in their larger game. But, when Nasser
returned, he and the Israelis accepted the Rogers Plan, and in August
of 1970, the fighting halted along the Suez Canal, and a 90 day truce
began.
This truce was criticized once again by some of the Arab
powers, including the Newly formed PLO, who openly advocated the
removal of Nasser from power. This led to a conflict between the PLO
and Egypt, and many PLO members were expelled from Egypt. During this
time, Egypt desiring a true, in conjunction with Jordan attacked PLO
and other territory bases in order that they would not jeopardize the
treaty. During this time, when Nassar was attempting to bring the PLO
together once again with the rest of the Arab world, Nassar became
sick and died.
When Nasser died, it became apparent that his successor, Anwar
as Sadat, did not intend to be another Nasser. As Sadat’s rule
progressed, it became clear that his priority was solving Egypt’s
pressing economic problems by encouraging Western financial
investment. He wished to regain relations the United State, hoping for
US investment into his country, and pushed the idea of peace as a
means for prosperity.
On February 4, 1971, Sadat announced a new peace initiative
with Israel, that called for peace in return for a partial withdraw
from Sinai. A timetable would then be set for Israel’s withdrawal from
the rest of the occupied. Egypt would reopen the canal, restore
diplomatic relations with the United. Sadat’s initiative fell on deaf
ears in Tel Aviv and in Washington. According to sources at the time,
the State Department still viewed Egypt as a threat in the cold war
conflict.
Internally, the Egyptian economy was being steadily drained by
the confrontation with Israel. Economic problems were becoming more
serious because of the tremendous amount of resources directed toward
building up the military since the June 1967 War, and it was clear
that Sadat would have to demonstrate some results from his new policy.
In the last half of 1972, there were large-scale student riots, and
some journalists came out publicly in support of the students. Thus,
Sadat felt under increasing pressure to go to war against Israel as
the only way to regain the lost territories.
On October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces launched a successful
surprise attack across the Suez Canal. The Syrians carried out an
attack on Israel at the same time. For the Arabs, it was the fasting
month of Ramadan, and for Israel it was Yom Kippur. The next day,
President Nixon formally asked Congress for emergency funds to finance
the massive airlift of arms to Israel that was already under way.
During this time, the Major Oil producers in the region cut back
production to the United States as an embargo because of these
actions.
Israel was able to counterattack and succeeded in crossing to
the west bank of the canal and surrounding the Egyptian Army. Sadat
appealed to the Soviet Union for help. On October 22, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire by all parties
within twelve hours in the positions they occupied. Egypt accepted the
cease-fire, but Israel, alleging Egyptian violations of the
cease-fire, completed the encirclement Army to the east of the canal.
The Soviet Union was furious, believing it had been
double-crossed by the United States. On October 24, the Soviet
ambassador handed Kissinger a note from Brezhnev threatening that if
the United States was not prepared to join in sending forces to impose
the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would act alone. Luckily the UN sent
a force there to enforce the cease-fire.
Meanwhile, Syria felt betrayed by Egypt because Sadat did not
inform his ally of his decision to accept the cease-fire. Two days
after Sadat, Syria accepted the cease-fire as well. The Israelis,
however, paid a heavy price for merely holding their attackers to an
inconclusive draw. The war had a devastating effect on Israel’s
economy and was followed by savage austerity measures and drastically
reduced living standards. For the first time, Israelis witnessed the
humiliating spectacle of Israeli were seen on Arab television. Also,
for the first time captured Israeli hardware was exhibited in Cairo.
Sadat’s prestige grew tremendously. The war, along with the
political moves Sadat had made previously, meant that he was totally
in control and able to implement the programs he wanted. He was the
hero of the day. In 1977 the outlook for peace between Israel and
Egypt was not good. Israel still held most of Sinai, and negotiations
had been at a stalemate since the second disengagement agreement in
1975. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was a hard-liner and a
supporter of Israeli expansion. He approved the development of
settlements on the occupied West Bank and reprisal raids into southern
Lebanon. After the food riots of January 1977, Sadat decided that
something dramatic had to be done, and so on November 19, 1977, in
response to an invitation from Begin, Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem,
and agreed upon peace.
Many Egyptians accepted peace with Israel if it meant
regaining Egyptian territories. Of the Arab countries, only Sudan,
Oman, and Morocco were favorable to Sadat’s trip. In the other Arab
states, there was shock and dismay. The Arabs felt that Sadat had
betrayed the cause of Arab solidarity and the Palestinians. In spite
of Sadat’s denials, the Arabs believed that he intended to go it alone
and make a separate peace with Israel.
In fact, that is what happened. In December 1977, Egypt and
Israel began peace negotiations in Cairo. These negotiations continued
on and off over the next several months, but by September 1978 it was
clear that they were deadlocked. President Jimmy Carter had become
closely involved in the negotiations. In an effort to break the
deadlock, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David. The
negotiations were tense and almost broke down several times. On
September 17, however, Carter announced that the Camp David Accords
had been reached. They consisted of two parts, the Framework for Peace
in the Middle East and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Israel and Egypt.
The Camp David Accords made Sadat a hero in Europe and the
United States. The reaction in Egypt was generally favorable, but
there was opposition from the left. In the Arab world, Sadat was
almost universally condemned. Only Sudan issued an ambivalent
statement of support. The Arab states suspended all official aid and
severed diplomatic relations. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League,
which it was instrumental in founding, and from other Arab
institutions. Saudi Arabia withdrew the funds it had promised for
Egypt’s purchase of American fighter aircraft.
In the West, where Sadat was extolled as a hero and a champion
of peace, the Arab rejection of the Camp David Accords is often
confused with the rejection of peace. The basis for Arab rejection was
opposition to Egypt’s separate peace with Israel. Although Sadat
insisted that the treaty provided for a comprehensive settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states and the PLO saw it as a
separate peace, which Sadat had vowed he would not sign. The Arabs
believed that only a unified Arab stance and the threat of force would
persuade Israel to negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian issue
that would satisfy Palestinian demands for a homeland. Without Egypt’s
military power, the threat of force evaporated because no single Arab
state was strong enough militarily to confront Israel alone.
The Camp David Accords brought peace to Egypt but not
prosperity. With no real improvement in the economy, Sadat became
increasingly unpopular. His isolation in the Arab world was matched by
his increasing remoteness from the mass of Egyptians. While Sadat’s
critics in the Arab world remained beyond his reach, increasingly he
reacted to criticism at home by expanding censorship and jailing his
opponents. In addition, Sadat subjected the Egyptians to a series of
referenda on his actions and proposals that he invariably won by more
than 99 percent of the vote. For example, in May 1979 the Egyptian
people approved the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty by 99.9 percent of
those voting.
Sadat’s handpicked successor, Husni Mubarak, was
overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum on October 24.
Mubarak’s main concern in regard to the Israeli conflict was concerned
to regain the Sinai Peninsula for Egypt and to return his country to
the Arab fold. One of Mubarak’s first acts was to pledge to honor the
peace treaty with Israel. In April 1982, the Israeli withdrawal from
Sinai took place as scheduled. A multinational force of observers took
up positions in Sinai to monitor the peace. Egypt was allowed to
station only one army division in Sinai. Since then, Egypt has had a
decent relationship with Israel and the United States, and it has been
seen by many Arab Countries as the traitor in many circumstances.
It is perceivable that without the influence of the United
States the peace in Israel would have been different, if not sooner.
The United States, in order to push the cold war policies saw Israel
and Egypt as pawn in their global game of politics. Especially in
the early years, neither country saw the United States as a enemy nor
as a ally, and thus depended on it for little. Yet, both countries saw
the possibility of gaining resources from the great western power, or
at least its enemy the USSR.
Under Carter, however the United States, perhaps for the first
time, played a peace-making role in the Middle East. Perhaps Carter
was being the peaceful President, or more likely he realized the need
for peace in the middle east in order to lower the gas prices, and for
the US to harness the immense resources of the region.