What Is Happiness And Is Our Own

What Is Happiness, And Is Our Own Happiness The Only Thing We Ultimately Desire Essay, Research Paper

Happiness, according not only to

utilitarianism but also to popular culture, is something that we should not

merely desire, but actively pursue. This seems to be, at first glance, a

plausible, indeed laudable, goal, but there is one inherent detail that needs

to be explained ? what happiness actually is. This is especially important in

the case of a philosophical doctrine like utilitarianism, to which the idea of

happiness is axiomatic. In this essay, I will argue that most attempts to

define the concept by using objective definitions of ?pleasure? are impossible,

and that ?pleasure? itself, although an element of happiness, is

unsatisfactory. An attempt will be made to suggest that ?virtue? and morality,

whilst commendable, cannot even form part of a subjective reading of happiness

A case will, though, be made to argue that despite the inability to find a

satisfactory definition, happiness is merely one of a group of feelings which

we ultimately desire. In Utilitarianism, Mill

defines happiness as ?pleasure and the absence of pain?, and the antonym

was defined as ?pain and the privation of pleasure?. Jean Austin has

pointed out that in his essay, Mill appears to sometimes use ?pleasure?

interchangeably with happiness. If this were Mill?s intention, then Mill is

using it erroneously. ?Pleasure? is a temporary experience, whilst happiness

relates to an overall assessment of one?s feelings over an extended period. I

may have been depressed all week, but I got momentary pleasure when I attended

a concert. Thus a better reading of Mill?s definition, which he does in fact

give, would be to see happiness as the net balance of pleasures contrasted to

pains. This goes some way to being more satisfactory: if I had an enjoyable

week I could say that I had lot of pleasurable experiences, and if there were

only a few minor disappointments it could indeed be said to be a ?happy? week.

Conversely, if it were truly unbearable save for one incident, it would be

absurd to say that happiness was obtained at least once during that week. Yet,

it still seems forced to consider ?pleasure? to be the sole ingredient of

happiness. A manic depressive may, despite experiencing many pleasurable

experiences, still be unable to be considered ?happy?. Despite these limitations, it still

appears that pleasurable experiences are the backbone to any attempt to define

happiness. Many things, though, can be said to offer pleasure, yet it may be

hard to justify most forms of temporary pleasure as a form of happiness. A

pleasurable sensation can be obtained more easily from alcohol than from

hiking, yet we would consider someone who preferred the former to the latter to

be a drunkard. Any definition of happiness would not wish to allow chemically

induced forms of pleasure to be an acceptable form. Mill wrote of a difference

between ?higher? and ?lower? pleasures, the latter being more sensuous and the

former more intellectual. Yet by suggesting this, he is turning pleasure into

an objective issue: how people consider the actions of others. I may prefer

listening to Mahler?s symphonies at a concert whilst my friend may prefer

dancing and drinking all night long in some nightclub. Indeed, we might equally

abhor each other?s choice. To say that the former is a higher form of pleasure

is not very far from displaying snobbery. Pleasure, and what constitutes it, is

a subjective decision. Further, some forms of pleasure that we should condone

are likely to be classed as ?lower? pleasures. Is an intellectual who has read

every publication about hill walking, contributed to debates on what kind of

footwear is more appropriate for various types of terrain, and maybe even

written extensively on the theory behind the sport, yet never actually set foot

on a moor in his life indulging in a higher form of pleasure than someone who

heads out into the wilderness at every opportunity? Most of us would be

inclined to consider the latter to be experiencing a higher form of pleasure,

yet Mill?s distinction seems to suggest the former would.[1]

Any attempt to redefine the categories to allow for such examples would

ultimately fail: what gives pleasure and what does not is a matter for the

individual.? For these reasons, any attempt to

define happiness in terms of pleasure is unlikely to lead to a satisfactory

result. Indeed, there is a case that a certain element of pain may be needed to

achieve happiness. Risk-taking is usually applauded by society: even if the

plan fails one can learn from it. It may even lead to a more fulfilling life,

in which one is continually striving for happiness yet has to undergo numerous

setbacks. This, though, also seems to suggest an objective form of happiness:

someone wants an easy, risk-free life is likely to be just as happy as the

risk-taker. We, when asked to pass judgment on who we consider to have had the

more fulfilling, and thus happier, life may disagree, but to do this to suggest

that happiness is objective, rather than subjective. Novell Smith has described

this quite acutely when he says that a drunkard and a gourmet both aim at

pleasure, ?but what pleases each of them is a different thing?. If pleasure is

to be accepted into a definition of happiness, it can only do so in a

subjective way. Whilst pleasurable actions might be said to contribute to

happiness, their temporary nature needs to be accounted for. Moreover, one may wish to do things

that do not provide pleasure, yet still lead to happiness. The obvious paradox

of masochism aside, there are cases where this can be suggested to do so. A

martyr may choose to go to the stake because of a belief of some reward for

remaining true to one?s beliefs in the next world. As will be discussed later,

a hedonist may feel that he therefore gets pleasure from this expectation, but

it still can be said that he is not gaining pleasure from the actual process. If happiness cannot be defined, can

it still be said to be the only thing we ultimately desire? Before hedonism is

discussed, it is worth looking what is meant by ?to desire?. Austin accuses

Mill of using this verb to cover the same ground as the verb ?to want?, which