?Lions Led By Donkeys.? Essay, Research Paper
“Lions led by donkeys.” Can this criticism be applied fairly to the Allied
leaders responsible for the Gallipoli Campaign? Discuss.
The Gallipoli Campaign is recorded in British history and through popular memory
as a heroic disaster: a possibly war-winning scheme that ended in complete
disarray. The horror of the First World War was encapsulated in this microcosm
of the wider conflict. It shared much with the Western Front in terms of the
discomfort of the trenches and the stalemate that came with them. But it also
had the difficulties of the amphibious nature of the operation as well as the
extremes of climate that the troops experienced. The Leadership that sent the
Allied troops to the Dardenelles has often been criticised for the foolhardiness
of the operation, but as the British Official Historian stated: “There is little
doubt today that the idea of forcing the straits …… was one of the few great
strategical concepts of the world war.” So why now does the whole campaign
receive criticism as strong as the following?
With the possible exception of the Crimean War, the Gallipoli expedition was the
most poorly mounted and ineptly controlled operation in modern British military
history.
The answer lies within the quotation itself, specifically that it was “poorly
mounted and ineptly controlled”. In order to demonstrate this it will be
necessary to consider several levels of the “leadership” involved with the
operation. Initially the political-strategical decision making must be studied
as the root to the operations problems. The Naval and Army’s planning must also
be scrutinised as this fundamentally doomed the troops to failure. Finally the
tactical leadership must be considered in light of the situation developing on
the ground and how the Turks reacted to the amphibious landings.
Before scrutinising the expedition in any detail the background of the situation
must be explained so that one can have some sort of perspective on the decisions
that were made. By the end of 1914 a stalemate had developed in Europe. Already,
after only three full months of fighting, there were almost one million Allied
casualties and a trench system that stretched three hundred and fifty miles from
the North Sea to the Swiss Alps. No obvious successes were apparent in this
impasse; the Allies did not even seem to be wearing down the Germans in this
attritional form of warfare. Thus within the British higher command people were
looking at some form of flanking manoeuvre. Churchill and Lloyd George were keen
proponents of considering alternatives other than focusing entirely on the
theatre of conflict in the West. However many of the British and French General
Staff were wholly resolute on attacking the Germans head-on, quite
understandably so for the over-run French. As for the British, with their
traditional strength lying in their Naval and expeditionary forces, one is
surprised that alternatives to a continental land war were not considered more
readily. For example Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord’s proposition of a Naval
led invasion into Northern Germany through the Baltic. No such plans were given
much credibility by the General Staff’s overwhelming desire to fight a land war.
Ultimately this opposition of the General Staff was soon tempered by events in
Russia.
The battles of Masurian Lakes and Tannenberg, August 1914 crippled Russia’s
war-fighting ability in two successive blows by the Germans. In order for the
Allies to keep Germany under pressure the war had to be fought on two fronts.
Those in the West were determined to prolong Russia’s war efforts for as long as
possible. Therefore when the British received requests for assistance from The
Grand Duke Nicholas, The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, they were
taken seriously. In effect what he suggested was a naval or military
demonstration in order to place pressure on the Turks who were in turn placing
pressure on the Russian Army in the Caucasus. The pivotal role that the
Gallipoli operation could have had can clearly be seen from this summary by Sir
William Robertson:
The advantages to be derived from forcing the straits were perfectly obvious.
Such a success would, as the advocates of the project said, serve to secure
Egypt, to induce Italy and the Balkan states to come in on our side, and, if
followed by the forcing of the Bosporus, would enable Russia to draw munitions
from America and Western Europe, and to export her accumulated supplies of
wheat.
Although a most succinct appraisal of the situation ironically Robertson opposed
the scheme. This was a characteristic of the Dardenelles operation in that many
people in positions of authority could see the benefits that it could
potentially bring yet still they would not take their focus from Western Europe.
Thus a key facet to the campaign’s failure was in British high command;
throughout its implementation there was a constant need to plan based on
compromise. On a strategic level the disparity between the military commanders
and the political leadership of the country was immediately apparent. The
political hierarchy had a broader perspective of the international situation;
they realised the potential that Turkey held in the Dardenelles’ position and
therefore coveted it. The Military command, predominantly the Army were solely
focused on the job in hand. The Turks, however, were also aware of the British
need to have influence in the area. They were also aware that Russia and Greece
were only too willing to join Britain in supporting any such operation as it
would allow Turkish lands to be carved up as spoils of war. A result of which
would be the Russian gain of much desired access to “warm-water” ports. Due to
these pressures the Turks were pushed toward German influence at a very early
stage of the war because of the perceived greater threat from the Allies.
The military hierarchy had, as previously suggested, been totally focused on the
forces deployed in France. Kitchener was initially resolute that he had no
forces which he could possibly send eastward. A result of this was an attempt to
force the straits with a purely naval operation of a combined British and French
fleet during February and March 1915, as a result of the Russian call for
assistance. This was not the first attempt of the war to use a naval force to
attack the area of the Straits. In November 1914 the Mediterranean Squadron of
the Royal Navy bombarded the forts at Sedd-el-bahr and Kum Kale either side of
the mouth of the Dardenelles. This twenty minute action did little to the Turks
other than wake them to the prospect of further, perhaps more serious attempts
to force the straits. The initial plan of 1915 to try and take the Straits by a
progressive bombardment whilst steadily moving up the channel. The over-riding
reason was the political aim of the operation, in that its intention was to
relieve pressure on Russian military forces. What also spurred the naval project
forward was the success, albeit limited, of the previous year’s bombardment. The
Royal Navy did recognise the land based threat that the forts held however what
they failed to realise that in order to prevent the guns being repaired and
brought back into action the ground had to be held. The small parties of Marines
that did actually go ashore during the operation, although not necessarily for
this purpose, were inadequate. It was more through the dogmatic insistence of
Churchill and Admiral Fisher in the Admiralty on the operation that had it
approved, rather than any sound military planning. In fact the Admiralty and
General Staff had studied proposals for attacking Turkey through the Dardenelles
in 1904, 1906, 1908 and 1911 and had concluded a naval force alone could not
achieve the aim. Yet still the British hierarchy allowed the operation to
continue because of its strategic importance. Any chance of real success for the
later joint operations were severely limited by this “compromised” attempt at
action.
By 23 March 1915, after a month of attempting the naval option both Admiral de
Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton considered the plan to have failed. Under
the command of Admiral Carden, de Robeck’s predecessor and originator of the
plan, the fleet had lost a third of its strength: six ships in all to mines and
gun-battery fire. Hamilton had been dispatched by Kitchener to aid Carden with
forces drawn from the Middle East. Fundamentally this decision had been arrived
at too late and this phase of the operations mounted in the area were at an end.
Again this period of action in the Dardenelles had forewarned the Turks and
their German advisory command under General Liman von Sanders. So the actual
landings themselves were a part of larger picture of operations which had
occurred in the area of the Dardenelles. Each British engagement had escalated
the level of violence and each attempt to force the Dardenelles was only just
rebuffed until a full scale landing force was required to achieve any
significant success.
Sir Ian Hamilton was given an “Army” to conduct the Gallipoli campaign, but this
was very much an army in terms of paperwork rather than experience. It consisted
of a mix and match of various units from throughout the Empire. By far the most
experienced was the 29th Division which consisted of various Regular units drawn
from overseas postings. As a Division they had hardly operated at all, and the
operation they were about to embark on was far from the usual garrisoning
activities that they were used to conducting. After the 29th the only other unit
with any real prior experience was the Royal Navy Division. This too had its
flaws, in that it comprised of mainly fleet Marines who had predominantly served
as auxiliaries to ships. This was apparent in their lack of heavy equipment;
they were seriously lacking in any sort of artillery. Even at this stage one can
see how the higher command back in England, with its preoccupation with the
Western Front, severely hampered the efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean by the
nature of the “experienced” troops it provided. The remainder and the bulk of
the force was made up of conscripted men. The Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps (ANZACS) were to prove their valour in the following action, but also to
show their inadequate training and experience on the tactical level of command.
Supplementing these forces was an Indian Brigade and a Territorial Division both
of which lacked any indirect fire support. In all the lack of Artillery was to
prove one of the decisive points in the forthcoming fighting. The Turkish guns
and snipers were to prove themselves deadly adversaries to the
especially in the ANZAC areas. The lack of Allied fire support compounded the
difficulty the men had in attacking high ground over exposed slopes. The
inadequate fire support can also trace its origins to the strategic level
planning. The Western front itself had scarcely adequate shells or artillery
pieces and each gun averaged less than ten rounds per day, a hopeless amount
during offensive operations. In terms of the Gallipoli offensive on paper the
Divisions involved were supposed to have had a compliment of at least three
hundred and six guns to support them; in reality they had one hundred and
eighteen. Here again the influence of the Western front was to take its toll:
the landings on the 25th April coincided with the 2nd Ypres offensive, the
stock-piling of munitions for this had a knock on effect on the Gallipoli
planning.
Thus the nature of the troops that were to conduct this operation and the
manner in which they were prepared was to play a decisive role in the conduct of
the operation. Flaws in the strategic planning were to have a noticeable effect
during the later campaign. Flaws that could have been avoided had the operation
been planned from the start as a decisive joint operation. Instead the
intermittent efforts of the Royal Navy, who were clearly forced into action
prematurely by political pressure in the need to support Russia and Churchill’s
insistence on action, warned the Turks of future attacks.
Although fettered by the insufficient material support from his superiors,
Hamilton’s concept of operations and planning was actually quite successful in
that Liman von Sanders could not pin-point where the main thrust of the landings
was to arrive. Even on the first day of the landings von Sanders concentrated
his own efforts around Bulair forty miles to the North of Cape Helles. However,
events were to take a turn for the worse through accident and more significantly
lack of command. A comparison of the events on the 25th of April show very
different reactions by the ANZACS and British forces. In the case of the ANZACS
mistakes on landing sites were to cripple their operation, for the Lancashire
Regiment on W and V beaches of Cape Helles it was to save many lives. The
reaction of the two different units shows the contrast between the experienced
and inexperienced but also highlights the flaws of the command and control in
each. The ANZAC forces were to land North of the main beaches in the area of
Gaba Tepe, however, either through navigational error or the effect of currents
they landed several miles further up the coast. The effect of this was
ultimately to stifle the Antipodeans’ assault.
Although they did make rapid inroads initially with little resistance they
floundered under the counter-attack led by Mustafa Kemal the commander of the
Turkish 19th Division. In reality Kemal had only a Regiment to hold the ANZACS
within their perimeter. But the Australian and New Zealanders showed their lack
of combat experience during these early vital stages. Instances of the ANZACS
being delayed on seeing the Turks lie down made them hesitate enough for
reinforcements to arrive under Kemal’s control. The ANZACS had assumed that
there was some sort of threat hence the Turks taking cover, in fact it was a
deception plan devised by Kemal. A ruse that would not have worked on the more
battle hardened troops who would have been aware of the urgency to push on
during this early phase. The ANZAC commanders were not resolute in their
actions; the incorrect landing sites threw them off guard which led them to make
fundamental errors that were to cause constant problems later. The ANZACS were
aware that they had to push inland yet instead of adapting to the location in
which they found themselves they tried to stick to the original plan. They
attempted to march onto their original objectives, but the geography and enemy
resistance were to hamper them. This inertia caused the ANZACS to fail to see
that in the environment they found themselves domination of the high ground was
paramount for success. By the time they realised this Mustafa Kemal had
consolidated his positions even though throughout this phase of the battle he
had be outnumbered by no less than three to one.
The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers were to assault the two central beaches
of the main landing sites. These were named W and V and were to be the location
of some of the bloodiest fighting of the first day. For the Lancashires relief
for the troops caught in the thick of the fray came from a company who had
landed incorrectly to the flank on the main position. The significant difference
between these regular soldiers and the ANZACS was they used the mistake to their
advantage and rolled up the flank of the enemy, thus relieving the troops on the
beach. The resolute spirit of the Lancashires is reflected in their Regimental
toast which originates from that day: “Six VC’s before breakfast!” The result of
the blood shed on these beaches and those immediately neighbouring them was that
the original landing parties were a spent force. They could not consolidate
their gains. It is at this point that the planning and command structure’s
failings show the most.
The concept of the landings was successful in that Liman von Sanders did not
know were to concentrate his forces in order to repel the British. A
diversionary landing by the French at Kum Kale across the Bosporus was a success
and drew much of the Turkish forces to the Asiatic side of the Dardenelles.
Equally the demonstration by the Royal Naval Division drew attention away from
the landings around Cape Helles. However, it was through the resilience of the
sub-units of the Turkish Army that the landings failed to achieve their desired
effects. The majority of the resistance that the British encountered came from
platoon or company held positions which were well sited to counter an attack.
The failing that the British experienced was not indecisiveness, as was the case
with the ANZACS, but their inflexibility. These Regular units were well
practised in the traditional British ordered form of fighting. However, this
resulted in an inability to move away from the given plan in order to adapt to
the situation on the ground. This was certainly the case at Cape Helles. Whilst
three regiments were being massacred on the central axis of the landings the
units on the flanks had taken their objectives. Tragically they were either
unaware or reluctant to do anything about the situation less than two miles
march from their own positions.
Hamilton was also at fault during this time. He had ensconced himself on HMS
Queen Elizabeth during the battle. The ship itself had its own responsibilities
during the landings in terms of providing fire support, and had inadequate
signalling equipment for an amphibious force commander. So from the outset
Hamilton had cut himself off from any direct intervention with the action on the
ground. At most he could steam up and down the coast, but this too was also
constrained by the missions of the warship. Furthermore the two corps
commanders, Hunter-Weston with the British at Cape Helles and Birdwood with the
ANZACS at Gaba Tepe, were also afloat and they too had inadequate signalling
equipment to the shore. Fundamentally those that were in command of the major
areas of responsibility were not in any position to react to the situation on
the ground. It was from this that the momentum of the Allied landings ground to
a halt. Lack of experience and inertia at the lower levels of command and the
Commander-in-Chief’s inability to formulate any sort of informed picture of
events on the ground caused the operation to flounder at this early, vital
stage.
Subsequent operations in the Dardenelles were equally unsuccessful. By the end
of May U-boats had sunk three British ships providing fire support. As a result
HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn with the rest of the Fleet supporting the
operations causing the support for those on land to be weakened further still.
The Sulva Bay landings during August 1915 were much more adequately equipped for
instance they had powered barges capable of landing up to five hundred men. Yet
the fundamental problems were still there: inertia from inexperience on the
ground, and the distanced and non-contactble senior commanders. The latter were
often so inured by their Western Front experiences during the Sulva Bay landings
that they too readily dug in. This later phase of the Dardenelles campaign
showed that the soldiers were far from defeated themselves. The diversionary
attack by the ANZACS during the Sulva Bay landings were extremely costly in
terms of casualties, however, the soldiers demonstrated their fighting spirit in
that fifteen Victoria Crosses were awarded at the Battle of Lone Pine Ridge
alone.
Hamilton’s replacement, Sir Charles Monro, was mocked by Churchill because his
first recommendation on arrival in October 1915 was to withdraw. Churchill
stated “He came, he saw, he capitulated.” However, Monro was a Western Front
commander held in high regard. On inspecting the situation himself Kitchener
agreed to Monro’s plans. Even at this late stage of the Gallipoli campaign one
can see the machinations of politics at work in the decision-making process.
Huge pressure had been levied upon the British hierarchy to conduct this
operation, yet its execution was half-hearted in terms of preparation at the
strategic level and ineptly commanded at the tactical level. Again the British
Official Historian puts this quite succinctly:
Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915
would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to
spring from one fundamental cause – an utter lack of preparation before the
campaign began.
This lack of preparation can be seen in the intermittent naval actions that did
little material damage to the Turks but succeeded in warning them of further
action. These were carried out with complete disregard to prior tactical
planning that had taken place concerning the very same scenario. Nonetheless the
pressure that was placed upon those in Government, particularly Churchill, for
the operation to succeed caused sound tactical planning such as the need for
surprise to be ignored. Hamilton’s attempts were crippled from the outset due to
the inadequate experience of the bulk of his forces, and the lack of necessary
battle-winning artillery. His method of command was the underlying factor
however in that it was indecisive and far too removed to affect the action on
the ground. At lower levels this caused stagnation and stalemate on the
battlefield.