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Silicon Graphics Essay Research Paper Silicon Graphics

Silicon Graphics Essay, Research Paper


Silicon Graphics: Computers for 3-D


Silicon Graphics, Inc.


(SGI) is a manufacturer of high-end computers specifically designed for


the rendering and manipulation of three-dimensional images. At a time


when computer technology has become increasingly standardized and specialized,


SGI has been described as a throwback to an earlier age of computing because


the company manufactures its own workstations, central processors and


operating software.


Although Silicon Graphics workstations are best known


for their creation of the stunning cinematic effects seen in many recent


Hollywood blockbusters, they are also the tool of choice for a wide range


of applications that require the absolute highest level of 3-D graphic


capability. Examples include flight simulation, product design, scientific


modeling, Internet graphics and gaming software. A list of SGI’s


customers include many of the world’s largest governments and corporations.


SGI’s strong growth over a period of nearly a decade


has been based on its production of successively cheaper workstations


that embody capabilities previously not available at each given price


level. The company has thus been able to create new markets for its products


by stimulating new productive applications of 3-D technology.


Although the price of SGI’s lowest-end workstations


has fallen to about $6,000, the company has chosen not to take the final


step into the highly competitive, low margin market for personal computers


(PCs). This strategy has drawn some criticism from analysts and shareholders


who question where the markets will be found to fuel the company’s


future growth. In response to these concerns (and to an associated drop


in the valuation of their stock) SGI has begun to move into some consumer


markets, producing PC-compatible software and graphics cards. At the same


time, the company continues to cater to its elite market, bringing progressively


greater levels of "supercomputer" power to its upper and mid-level


users.


History and Founding


The success of Silicon Graphics has been built upon the


technological innovations and business instincts of co-founder Jim


Clark. Clark, a Ph.D. computer scientist, took a four-year appointment


at Stanford University for the


express purpose of developing a technology that would serve as the basis


for a start-up company. Clark left Stanford in 1982, along with some of


his colleagues and students, and founded Silicon Graphics. The company’s


objective was to produce computers that would provide greater 3-D capability


than any existing platform by obtaining more efficient use of computing


power.


SGI’s technological success was accomplished by the


application one of Clark’s own innovations, the geometry engine (also


known as a graphics engine). The geometry engine is a method of embedding


complex algorithms for the generation of 3-D images onto the hardware


of a computer chip. The resulting architecture effectively transfers capability


from software to hardware, allowing a computer to almost instantaneously


perform complex 3-D functions that would otherwise require it to read


thousands of lines of code. SGI’s first workstations allowed engineers,


designers and artists, for the first time, to pick-up, rotate, and effectively


"walk through" complex 3-D objects on the screen in real time.


Clark’s describes his own role during the early years


of SGI as providing vision and technological knowledge. To manage the


day-to-day operation of the company, as well as to implement long term


strategy, he hired Ed


McCracken in 1984 to serve as CEO. McCracken, a former division president


at Hewlett-Packard (HP), was reportedly so


anxious to leave his previous employer that he took a very substantial


cut in salary in order to join the fledgling SGI. Although McCracken has


become known for the freewheeling and casual management style he brought


to Silicon Graphics, he has been able to take firm and immediate control


of the company’s operation and its market strategy. It was McCracken


who guided SGI’s move toward lower-priced computers, a formula that


would sustain the company’s growth for the better part of a decade.


McCracken was also responsible for negotiating a series of fruitful deals


and alliances with mega-corporations such as Time-Warner


Cable, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph,


AT&T and Nintendo.


Clark recalls that as a start-up company, Silicon Graphics


was not an overnight sensation. It took a good five years of "preaching


the gospel of 3-D graphics" before sales of SGI’s workstations


really began to take off. The company placed its first workstation on


the market in 1985, and in 1987 introduced its first model with RISC (Reduced


Instruction Set Computer) chip technology. RISC is a unique architecture


that reduces chip complexity, significantly adding to the efficiency of


SGI workstations. The RISC chip used by SGI was manufactured by MIPS Computer


systems. SGI purchased MIPS in 1992, and has manufactured its own RISC


chip since that time.


Almost immediately following the release of SGI’s


first RISC-based system, it was adopted by the US military for the graphic


simulation of weapon trajectories. Within a short time, many of the world’s


most advanced research and design units had discovered SGI technology.


British Aerospace and NASA, for example, use SGI workstations for product


design and flight simulation. Boeing Aircraft used SGI technology to essentially


"walk through" the on-screen plans for their new 777 aircraft,


achieving tolerances of less than a 1000th of an inch without paper plans.


Volkswagen is one of several automobile manufacturers to make similar


use of SGI workstations to design its automobiles, as well as to design


the process by which they are built.


Beginning in about 1988, when SGI began to place lower-end


workstations on the market, the company began a period of steady growth


of about 40 percent per year that lasted until the middle of 1995. By


then SGI’s annual revenues were in excess of $2 billion, and the


company employed more than 7,000 worldwide.


Clark resigned in 1994 to found Netscape with Marc


Andreessen. McCracken remains as chief executive to guide Silicon


Graphics at a time when intense competition, not the least of which comes


from his former employer HP, has begun to erode SGI’s market share


and threaten the company’s growth.


Hollywood Meets SGI


The best known of SGI’s customers have been the companies


that specialize in the production of 3-D effects for the Hollywood film


industry. In the early 1990s, film makers who often spent millions of


dollars on special effects that used extravagant models and stop-action


animation discovered what SGI’s 3-D technology could do. The result


of SGI’s encounter with Hollywood has been the kind of eye-popping


effects that were first seen in Jurassic


Park, and then in a string of blockbusters including Terminator


II, Star Trek, True


Lies, Batman


Forever, Casper


and Toy


Story. The technology behind 3-D effects can be as complex and


demanding as the most sophisticated industrial or research applications.


The computer generated ghost in Casper, for example, required storage


of 27 trillion bytes of data. At the level of capability required to execute


such programs, SGI has no equals. Therefore, the top 3-D effects production


firms in Hollywood and Silicon Valley rely almost exclusively on SGI workstations.


In mid 1995, SGI entered into agreements with Lucasfilm’s


Industrial Light and Magic (ILM) and with Stephen


Spielberg’s, Jeffrey Katzenberg’s and David Geffen’s Dreamworks


to jointly develop systems to be used for computer animation. By 1996,


between 15 and 20 percent of SGI’s sales came from Hollywood and


the animation industry.


Strategy for Continuing Growth


In accordance with the vision of company founder Jim Clark,


and with the concrete strategy executed by Jim McCracken, SGI has succeeded


over the years in making advanced 3-D technology available at an increasingly


low price. This strategy has allowed the company to sustain a high level


of growth for nearly a decade by bringing a high level of 3-D capability


to institutions that could not have previously afforded it. But in spite


of Clark’s one-time ambition to ultimately move into the PC and home


market, SGI has elected to stay with its elite, high-margin niche. This


has caused some concern among shareholders that SGI will not be able to


find the new markets that will be required to sustain growth in an increasingly


competitive industry. Begi

nning around the third quarter of 1995, SGI’s


40% per year growth began to slow appreciably in the face of sharp competition.


Because SGI’s chip and architecture are specifically


geared toward 3-D application, its workstations will continue for some


time to offer 3-D capability superior to any found on general purpose


systems. In recent years, however, competitors have begun to offer very


high levels of 3-D capability for a fraction of the cost of even SGI’s


lowest-end workstations. Most PCs now come equipped with advanced 3-D


graphics. At the middle performance level, the two largest manufacturers


of high-end workstations, Hewlett Packard and Sun


Microsystems, are taking direct aim at SGI’s high-margin business.


By stacking two or four Pentium Pro chips in one PC and using relatively


cheap software based on Windows


NT, their newest systems deliver sufficient capacity to provide a


viable alternative for SGI machines costing five times as much.


In short, Although SGI remains unsurpassed at almost every


level of 3-D computing, competitors are closing the gap at the low and


middle levels by offering products that come progressively closer to SGI


quality for a fraction of the price. Even SGI’s most noted customers


in Hollywood have told sources they are looking into these alternatives


for at least some applications. Some industry experts expect the Windows


NT/Pentium Pro machines to continue to narrow the performance gap, leaving


Silicon Graphics with a shrinking niche market of those users who need


the most advanced graphics capabilities and can afford to pay for it.


Among those who question SGI’s long-term growth potential is company


co-founder and former chairman, Jim. Clark. In Clark’s words, "they


can own the high-end of the market — it just isn’t a very exciting


place to be."


In an effort to find new growth markets, SGI has initiated


some forays into consumer markets. The company has formed a consumer products


division to build and sell new lines of PC-compatible graphics boards


and software, as well as to attempt to build on the success of its Nintendo


64 game machine. At the higher levels of its market, SGI continues to


provide more for less to its big institutional customers.


Most significant in the latter respect has been SGI’s


purchase of Cray Research, the world’s


leading manufacturer of supercomputers, for $767 million. Prior to the


merger, the two companies together owned almost half of the $2 billion


scientific and engineering market. SGI hopes economies of scale and the


melding of the two company’s technologies will help lower the cost


of supercomputing power, enabling the company to broaden its market for


mid-level professional applications. Although company spokesmen do not


expect to realize the full benefits from the integration of the technological


standards of the two companies until around the turn of the century, SGI


has already used Cray’s crossbar switch technology — a system that


facilities rapid connections between memory, central processors, graphics


devices and peripherals — to increase the performance of their new midrange


Octane workstations. At the same time SGI is slashing the prices of their


low-end O2 systems, which have become the fastest-selling products in


the company’s history.


Supercomputers like the Origin 2000, only recently believed


to be an endangered species, are presently finding new markets at universities,


in manufacturing such as applications for automobile and aerospace plants,


in oil and gas exploration, and in weather forecasting. The rapid growth


of Asian economies has created an additional market for many of these


applications. SGI and its Cray subsidiary maintain a firm hold on their


share of the highest-end supercomputer market. The company has recently


sold three Cray systems to the Department of Defense Naval


Oceanographic Office, and in October of 1996 sold what was then the


world’s most powerful supercomputer to Los Alamos National Laboratory,


where it will be used to develop a simulated substitute for underground


nuclear testing.


SGI has additionally built an emerging business providing


computers to be used as servers for corporate intranets. In the rapidly


growing intranet market, the company expects to gain a significant advantage


during the next few years from the integration of Cray’s parallel


processing technology.


Conclusion


Following a decade of constant innovation and growth,


Silicon Graphics continues to produce some of the world’s most advanced


computers in every category except that of the personal computer.


Having committed the greater part of its resources to


continued domination of the high end of computing, SGI’s success


in the coming years depends not only on staying ahead of its competition,


but also on the power of the global economy to find new uses and needs


for the power premium SGI’s high-level workstations offer. Considering


the rate at which technologies have been developed and put to use in recent


years, this seems a plausible, if not a certain, scenario.


SOURCES


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February 3, 1997.


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