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Bay Of Pigs 10 Pages Essay Research

Bay Of Pigs (10 Pages) Essay, Research Paper


B A Y O F P I G S


The story of the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of


Pigs, which is located on the south coast of Cuba about 97


miles southeast of Havanna, was one of mismanagement, poor


judgment, and stupidity (?Bay of Pigs? 378). The blame


for the failed invasion falls directly on the CIA (Central


Intelligence Agency) and a young president by the name of


John F. Kennedy. The whole intention of the invasion was to


assault communist Cuba and put an end to Fidel Castro.


Ironically, thirty-nine years after the Bay of Pigs, Fidel


Castro is still in power. First, it is necessary to look at


why the invasion happened and then why it did not work.


From the end of World War II until the mid-eighties,


most Americans could agree that communism was the enemy.


Communism wanted to destroy our way of life and corrupt the


freest country in the world. Communism is an economic


system in which one person or a group of people are in


control. The main purpose of communism is to make the


social and economic status of all individuals the same. It


abolishes the inequalities in possession of property and


distributes wealth equally to all. The main problem with


this is that one person who is very wealthy can be stripped


of most of his wealth so that another person can have more


material goods and be his equal.


The main reason for the Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba was


the change to communism. On January 1, 1959, Cuban dictator


Fulgencio Batista fled the country for the safety of the


Dominican Republic (Goode, Stephen 75). Fidel Castro and


his guerrilla warriors overthrew the old government dictated


by Batista. During the next couple of weeks, Castro


established a new government and on February 16, he was


officially declared premier (Finkelstein, Norman H. 127).


The United States accepted this new regime as a relief from


the harsh, corrupt, and unpopular government of Batista.


Soon after everything settled down, Castro and his men made


a rapid move to change their political course. He announced


his transformation to Marxism-Leninism and avowed his


friendship with the Soviet Union (Goode, Stephen 75).


These events upset the United States and there were concerns


about Castro becoming too powerful. One reason was the


friendship with the Soviet Union because Cuba was receiving


armed forces to expand and improve its army. Cuba received


30,000 tons of arms a year, which included Soviet JS-2


51-ton tanks, SU-100 assault guns, T-34 35-ton tanks, 76-mm


field guns, 85-mm field guns, and 122-mm field guns (Goode,


Stephen 75&76).


Fidel Castro took great pride in the armed forces. He


expanded the ground forces from 250,000 to 400,000 troops.


These figures put one out of every thirty Cubans in the


armed forces, compared to one out of every sixty Americans


(Goode, Stephen 76). Castro and communist Cuba was


generating a military establishment ten times larger than


that of Batista?s. Castro put together the best army any


Latin American country had ever had (Goode, Stephen 76).


Analysts in Washington were frightened by this news. They


were getting scared that Cuba might try to attack the United


States with Soviet missiles and missile launchers. Also,


they were afraid that Castro might attack other Latin


American countries. Both scenarios were not welcome in the


United States, and the downfall of Castro and the Cuban


government became the top priority of the CIA (Goode,


Stephen 76).


There were many Cubans that did not like Castro. They


flocked to the United States in order to escape communism.


These people were known as Cuban exiles (Goode, Stephen


76). On March 17, 1960, the CIA and President Eisenhower


got together and discussed the situation going on in Cuba.


They decided to arm and train these Cuban exiles for


guerrilla warfare against Cuba (Goode, Stephen 76&77). In


November 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected president. Upon


his election, he was informed of the Cuban crisis and after


being presented with the facts, he approved the invasion.


Many plans for the invasion were recognized, but the


best one came from Richard Bissel. He describes his plan in


a book entitled, CIA.


?The plan that was finally accepted was


a more complex and larger version of the


operation seven years earlier in


Guatemala. A force of Cuban exiles was


to secure a beachhead on Cuba?s


coastline while a fleet of B-26?s, the


most powerful war fighting plane, was to


put Castro?s air force out of commission


and disrupt transportation and


communication lines (Fursenko,


Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali 95).


Once the beachhead had been secured and


a portion of Cuban territory liberated,


a group of Cuban exile leaders would be


flown to Cuba to form a provisional


government. The United States would then


officially recognize the provisional


government as the one true government of


Cuba? (Goode, Stephen 77).


The invasion started on April 16, 1961. It lasted for


about three days. At the beginning, the CIA purchased


several farms in Florida where the Cuban exiles could begin


training (Goode, Stephen 77&78). Guatemala, Honduras, and


Nicaragua helped the invasion because they gave their


approval for CIA camps to be located in these regions


(Goode, Stephen 78). The Nicaraguan?s dictator, Anastasio


Somoca, disliked Castro tremendously. He said, ?Bring me


back a couple of hairs from Castro?s beard? (Robinson, Linda


53).


The invasion, which was code-named Operation Zapata,


consisted of around 1,400 to 1,500 exiles (Bay of Pigs


Revisited, The 3). The CIA chose Manuel Artime Buesa as


the leader of the troops (Goode, Stephen 79). He was a


former Castro soldier and his leadership abilities were said


to be excellent. His first move as leader was to get rid of


all he suspected disloyal or unqualified. Next, he replaced


many of the officials that had been training with the


soldiers in Latin American countries with officers who had


served in Fulgencio Batista?s army. These officers were


said to be ?thugs? who had been part of the former


dictator?s brutal government (Goode, Stephen 79).


President Kennedy ordered that there be none of Batista?s


men in the Liberation Army, which was the army making the


invasion, but these orders seemed to be ignored. About 200


of the exiles did not like Artime?s move to appoint


Batista?s men as heads of the Army. These men were given a


choice either to accept the officials or not accept it and


be flown to Guatemala to stay there until the invasion was


completed (Goode, Stephen 79).


Six months before the invasion, the United States did a


foolish thing. Ra?l Roa, the Cuban foreign minister, stated


in an interview at the United Nations, ?I have accurate


knowledge of the invasion?. He told them that he knew about


the exiles and their training in Guatemala, and he knew that


the CIA was in charge of the attack. Roa claimed that he


got the information from LIFE magazine, the New York Daily


News, and CBS (Goode, Stephen 79 & 80). Besides Roa,


Castro also acquired accurate and useful information. He


was very prepared for the invasion. Castro camouflaged the


small Cuban air force, and he constantly patrolled possible


invasion sites he heard were going to be targeted, including


the Bay of Pigs. The morning before the invasion, April 15,


1961, he ordered a nationwide alert (Goode, Stephen 80).


On April 14, 1961, the Liberation Army set sail on six


ships from Nicaragua. The Army consisted of about 1,500


troops and they had approximately five tanks, eighteen


mortars, fifteen recoilless rifles, four flame-throwers,


twelve rocket launchers, twelve landing crafts, and five


freighters to do battle with (Robinson, Linda 54). The


next day, the first strike was made on Cuba. The strike was


good for the Army because it destroyed at least half of


Castro?s planes, including B-26?s, Sea Furies, and T-33 jet


trainers (Goode, Stephen 80). This was an early attack on


Cuba, and Castro was not ready for this assault; therefore,


resulting in the destruction of half of Castro?s planes.


On April 16, the provisional government members


received word that the invasion was near. They flew to


Miami where they would hide out, and be ready to be taken to


Cuba if the invasion was successful (Goode, Stephen 80 &


81). The next thing the president did was very pivotal to


the success of the attack. President Kennedy canceled a


second scheduled air strike against Cuba. No one really


knew why he canceled the strike; however, he could have


believed the first strike did adequate damage to the Cuban


air force and a second would not be needed (Bay of Pigs


Revisited, The 4). In any case, the cancellation was


considered by the CIA to harm the operation and maybe


condemn it to failure (Nelson, Craig 1).


At midnight on April 16, the invasion began (Goode,


Stephen 81). Things got off to a bad start. The coral


reefs delayed several landing crafts and others experienced


engine trouble. Some of the exiles chose a ground invasion.


These troops penetrated about twenty miles into Cuba until


they ran into Castro?s militia. The militia had heavy


reinforcements which meant a quicker surrender for these


exiles (Goode, Stephen 81).


On Monday, April 17, the remaining planes of Castro?s


air force were able to impose great damage on the ships and


their invaders (Bay of Pigs Revisited, The 4). Two of the


Liberation Army?s ships were sunk, The Houston and


The Rio Candido, which sank with most of the Army?s


ammunition, oil, communications equipment, and men. Three


of the B-26?s that the Liberation Army had were shot down by


Cuba?s 20-mm cannons (Goode, Stephen 81). Later on that


dreadful Monday, President Kennedy approved a second air


strike, but it came too late. The exile force had been


thoroughly defeated. When the planes arrived, they were an


hour late because of the difference in time zones (Goode,


Stephen 81 & 82).


Of the 1,500 troops the army had at first, only 1,297


made it to Cuba. The others were killed at sea or deserted.


After the Liberation Army surrendered, 1,180 of the 1,297


were captured and taken as prisoners to Havanna (Fursenko,


Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali 95). Most of the captured


exiles confessed their connection with the CIA and spoke of


support from the United States (Goode, Stephen 82). Castro


was very angry with the United States and he told other


nations the dangers that existed with the United States.


Representatives spoke with Castro and came to a compromise.


The United States wanted the prisoners back, and Castro


needed medical supplies. They negotiated and Castro


released the prisoners to return to Florida in time for


Christmas, 1962 (Goode, Stephen 82).


On April 19, one day after the failure of the invasion,


Castro announced over the radio,


?The invaders have been annihilated.


The Revolution has emerged victorious.


It destroyed in less than seventy-two


hours the army organized during many


months by the imperialist government of


the United States? (Goode, Stephen 82).


Many people believed that Kennedy was the cause of the


failure. CIA officials and Cuban exiles believed Kennedy?s


failure to approve air strikes to back up the seaborne


invaders doomed the plan (Nelson, Craig 1). President


Kennedy publicly shouldered the responsibility, but


privately he blamed the CIA and his military advisers. He


also said that the agency needed reorganization (Goode,


Stephen 82). Although some CIA officials blamed the


president, numerous others blamed the agency as well. The


CIA director, Allen Dulles, resigned several months after


the invasion. He was replaced by John McCone, a prominent


businessman (Finkelstein, Norman H. 134). Many other CIA


officials either quit or were fired by President Kennedy.


Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA inspector general, wrote a


report. He is said to be one of the harshest critiques of


the invasion (Nelson, Craig 1). Kirkpatrick laid most of


the blame directly on the CIA. Allen Dulles, Richard


Bissell, and others resented the report and said that he had


betrayed the CIA (Goode, Stephen 83). The 150-page report


was finally released after sitting in the CIA director?s


safe for over thirty years. Some excerpts of the report


were released on February 21, 1998 to the Associated Press.


It said,


?The CIA?s ignorance, incompetence, as


well as its arrogance toward the 1,400


Cuban exiles it trained and equipped to


mount the invasion, was responsible for


the fiasco. The choice was between


retreat without honor and a gamble


between ignominious defeat and dubious


victory. The agency choose to gamble


at rapidly decreasing odds, misinforming


presidential officials, planning poorly,


using faulty intelligence, and


conducting an overt military operation


beyond their capability. The CIA


project went forward under the pathetic


illusion of deniability. Officials had


failed to advise the president at an


appropriate time, that success had


become dubious and to recommend that the


operation therefore be canceled?


(Nelson,Craig 1).


Other factors he criticized were the absence of adequate air


cover, the problems in maintaining secrecy and security,


press leaks, and the political infighting among the exiles


who seemed more suspicious of one another than Castro


(Goode, Stephen 84).


In conclusion, did the government really believe that a


force of 1,500 men were any match for Castro?s army of


400,000? Did they believe that their plan to attack was


foolproof? Did they take time to plan the attack, or were


they too anxious to oust Castro that they left out important


details? If they had stopped to ask themselves these


questions, it is likely that they would have called off the


whole thing.


Bibliography


?Bay of Pigs.? Encyclopedia Americana. 1998 edition.


Bay of Pigs Revisited, The. Online. Internet. 10 Oct. 2000.


Available http://www.eserver.org/history/bay-of-pigs.txt


Finkelstein, Norman H., Thirteen Days / Ninety Miles: The Cuban Missle


Crisis. New York: Simon & Schuster Publications, 1994.


Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. The Secret of the Cuban Missile


Crisis: ?One Hell of A Gamble.? New York: W.W. Norton &


Company, 1997.


Goode, Stephen. Central Intelligence Agency. New York: Franklin Watts


Company, 1982.


Nelson, Craig. ?CIA Report on Bay of Pigs Released.? The Associated


Press News Service 21 Feb. 1998: 1 – 2.


Robinson, Linda. ?The Price of Military Folly.? U.S. News and World


Report. 22 April 1996: 53 – 56.

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