РефератыИностранный языкThThe Downfall Of Communism In Eastern And

The Downfall Of Communism In Eastern And

Central Europe Essay, Research Paper


The Downfall of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe


The shocking fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe


in the late eighties was remarkable for both its rapidity and its


scope. The specifics of communism’s demise varied among nations,


but similarities in both the causes and the effects of these


revolutions were quite similar. As well, all of the nations


involved shared the common goals of implementing democratic


systems of government and moving to market economies. In each of


these nations, the communist regimes in power were forced to


transfer that power to radically different institutions than they


were accustomed to. Democracy had been spreading throughout the


world for the preceding two decades, but with a very important


difference. While previous political transitions had seen


similar circumstances, the actual events in question had


generally occurred individually. In Europe, on the other hand,


the shift from communism was taking place in a different context


altogether. The peoples involved were not looking to affect a


narrow set of policy reforms; indeed, what was at stake was a


hyper-radical shift from the long-held communist ideology to a


western blueprint for governmental and economic policy


development. The problem inherent in this type of monumental


change is that, according to Ulrich K. Preuss, “In almost all the


East and Central European countries, the collapse of


authoritarian communist rule has released national, ethnic,


religious and cultural conflicts which can not be solved by


purely economic policies” (47). While tremendous changes are


evident in both the governmental and economic arenas in Europe,


these changes cannot be assumed to always be “mutually


reinforcing” (Preuss 47). Generally it has been theorized that


the most successful manner of addressing these many difficulties


is the drafting of a constitution. But what is clear is the


unsatisfactory ability of a constitution to remedy the problems


of nationalism and ethnic differences. Preuss notes that when


the constitutional state gained favor in North America,


it was founded on the principle of the unitary state; it was not


designed to address the lack of national identity which is found


throughout Europe – and which is counter to the concept of the


constitutional state (48). “Measured in terms of socioeconomic


modernization,” writes Helga A. Welsh, “Central and Eastern


European countries had reached a level that was considered


conducive to the emergence of pluralistic policies” (19). It


seemed that the sole reason the downfall of communism, as it


were, took so long was the veto power of the Soviet Union.


According to theories of modernization, the higher the levels of


socioeconomic achievement, the greater the pressure for open


competition and, ultimately, democracy. As such, the nations in


Eastern and Central Europe were seen as “anomalies in


socioeconomically highly-developed countries where particularly


intellectual power resources have become widespread” (Welsh 19).


Due to their longtime adherence to communist policies, these


nations faced great difficulty in making the transition to a


pluralist system as well as a market economy. According to


Preuss, these problems were threefold: The genuine economic


devastations wrought by the communist regimes, the transformation


of the social and economic classes of the command economy into


the social and economic lasses of a capitalist economy and,


finally, the creation of a constitutional structure for


political entities that lack the undisputed integrity of a nation


state (48).


With such problems as these to contend with in re-


engineering their entire economic and political systems, the


people of East Germany seemed to be in a particularly enviable


position. Economically, they were poised to unite with one of


the richest countries, having one of the strongest economies, in


the entire world. In the competition for foreign investment,


such an alliance gave the late German Democratic Republic a


seemingly insurmountable lead over other nations. In regards to


the political aspects of unification, it effectively left a


Germany with no national or ethnic minorities, as well as having


undisputed boundaries. As well, there was no need to create a


constitution (although many of the pitfalls of constitution-


building would have been easily-avoided due to the advantages


Germany had), because the leaders of the GDR had joined the


Federal Republic by accession and, accordingly, allowed its Basic


Law to be extended over their territory. For all the good that


seemed to be imminent as a result of unification, many problems


also arose regarding the political transformation that Germany


was undergoing. Among these problems were the following: the


tensions between the Basic Law’s simultaneous commitments to


supranational integration and to the German nation state, the


relationship between the nation and the constitution as two


different modes of political integration and the issue of so-


called “backward justice” (Preuss 48). The Federal Republic of


Germany’s Basic Law has been the longest-lived constitution in


Germany’s history. Intended to be a short-lived, temporary


document, the Basic Law gained legitimacy as West Germany


continued to march towards becoming a major economic power and


effective democratic society. There seemed to be, at first, a


tension between the Basic Law’s explicit support of re-


unification and its promise to transfer sovereignty to a


supranational institution that would be created.


The conflict between West Germany’s goals of national unity


and international integration remained the main issue in the


country’s politics for many years. As Preuss no

tes, “It will be


extremely difficult to escape the economic and, in the long run


also political, implications of this double-bind situation of


Germany, one that remains a legacy of the postwar order” (51).


Since the unification of Germany was accomplished through


accession, it meant, strangely enough, that neither West nor East


Germany had a say in the other’s decision on whether to form a


unified state or what conditions such a unification would be


contingent upon, respectively. Put simply, the net effect of the


extension of the Basic Law to all of Germany did not guarantee


the implementation of a new joint governing policy or a new


constitution for the country. It seemed, as a result of some


esoteric articles of the Basic Law, that the GDR would cease to


exist legally and the FRG would survive. It was impossible to


draw the conclusion that both would die out and be replaced by a


new political identity. Many of the Federal Republic’s laws


immediately applied in the GDR (Gloebner 153). Article 146 of


the Basic Law, put simply, allowed for the annulment of the Basic


Law, to be replaced with another governing system, without


previously binding the people to any specific rules. Seemingly,


it sanctions revolution, and, “as proved to be the case in 1990,


this is not a purely theoretical conclusion” (Preuss 52). Some


suggest that, by unifying through accession, Germany has made


problems which could end up overshadowing the benefits of


unification. The suggestion is that the implementation of a


constitution by a society without experience in utilizing it,


without the necessary institutions and without the corresponding


value system will bring about more harm than good (politically).


The imposition of the Basic Law was the root for much of the


mistrust between East and West Germans following unification. In


regards to the East Germans, the Law was effectively self-


imposed, and “neither submission nor voluntary self-submission is


likely to engender the social and political coherence which is a


necessary condition for a stable democracy” (Preuss 54). In


regards to the economic aspects of unification, some major


problems exist in the transition to democracy and market


economics. According to Preuss, the two main issues included in


the realm of “backward justice” are the privatization of large


pieces of state property, and the punishment of the elites of the


previous regimes and their comrades under the headings of “self-


purification” and “collective amnesia.” The privatization issue


is among the thorniest involved in any country’s transition from


communism. For one, a system of procedures must be developed


simply to transfer such large amounts of property to private


citizens. Also, there must be mechanisms put in place to both


protect new owners from claims of previous owners and to satisfy


former owners without alienating possible future investors. The


problem boils down to the fact that private property laws do not


always coincide with the “fair” concept of restitution. As Petra


Bauer-Kaase writes, “East Germans still have difficulties in


adjusting to a political system where individuals have a great


deal of responsibility for their own life” (307). The former


East Germans look upon this issue with contempt, because it is


the Westerners who have control over the rules, as well as the


enforcement of those rules. This is merely one of a multitude of


instances where this mistrust manifests itself.


There are also the issues of self-purification and


collective amnesia. Due to the pervasive nature of the communist


regime’s surveillance programs and so forth, there is very little


room for anyone to claim pure hands. While West Germans can


claim that they are innocent by virtue of geography, East Germans


are never able to escape the suspicions that they may have been


part of the machine. Government jobs are denied to those who


were affiliated with the Stasi, and private businesses also may


deny employment to these citizens. While unification has


occurred theoretically, in reality the Germany today is one of de


facto separate-but-equal citizenship. There is no denying that


there have been many problems associated with the unification of


East and West Germany. The transition from communist state to


liberal democracy is a very difficult one, and there is no real


way to predict how the German experience will turn out. As


Preuss writes, “The transition from an authoritarian political


regime and its concomitant command economy to a liberal


democracy and a capitalist economy is as unprecedented as the


short-term integration of two extremely different societies – one


liberal-capitalist, one authoritarian-socialist – into one nation


state” (57). In other words, the unification of Germany is one


of the most complicated and unprecedented historical events since


the unification of Germany.


Jeremy Waldroop


Works Cited


Bauer-Kaase, Petra. “Germany in Transition: The Challenge of


Coping with Unification.”


German Unification: Processes and Outcomes. M. Donald Hancock


and Helga A. Welsh, eds.


Boulder: Westview, 1994. 285-311. Gloebner, Gert-Joachim.


“Parties and Problems of


Governance During Unification.” German Unification: Processes


and Outcomes. M. Donald


Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds. Boulder: Westview, 1994. 139-


61. Preuss, Ulrich K.


“German Unification: Political and Constitutional Aspects.”


United Germany and the New


Europe. Heinz D. Kurz, ed. Brookfield: Elgar, 1993. 47-58.


Welsh, Helga A. “The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and


the GDR: Evolution, Revolution, and Diffusion.” German


Unification: Processes and Outcomes. M. Donald Hancock and Helga


A. Welsh, eds. Boulder: Westview, 1994. 17-34.

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