The Plo Essay Research Paper Introduction

of the Israeli economy: these areas became the

second largest market for Israeli exports, provided

a pool of cheap labor for Israel, and offered a

field for lucrative Israeli investment. West Bank

and Gaza Strip workers had to pay part of their low

salaries into the Israeli social security fund, but

could not receive benefits. All residents were

heavily taxed, but the Palestinian workers received

much less benefits than the Israelis enjoyed. It came to the

point that the occupation not only paid for itself

but became profitable to the Israeli state.

—-Over the years the Israeli occupation

authorities expelled more than 1,700 Palestinians

for political offenses. They punished the families

of many suspects (often later found innocent) by

demolishing their homes. They arrested and detained

many thousands of Palestinians, often by means of

administrative detentions without trial that

bypassed even the military justice system.

Eventually so many people had been harmed by the

occupation in one way or another that a large

proportion of Palestinians apparently felt that

they had nothing left to lose.

—-What resulted starting on Dec. 9, 1987, was

clearly a popular uprising. It included children,

teenagers, adults, and elderly people, men and women,

every class of the population from laborers to

wealthy merchants, and every region from the cities

and towns to the refugee camps to isolated

villages. Medical relief committees, food

distribution cooperatives, local agricultural

production initiatives, educational committees, and

other ad hoc local groups sprang up to sustain the

uprising. The uprising was led in each locality by

a committee representing all the area’s political

forces–generally the three or four main groups

composing the PLO (Nasser and Heacock, 1990).. A

similar leadership formed at higher regional

levels, and it was topped by an underground

coordinating group that signed its periodic

communiques “PLO–Unified National Leadership of

the Uprising in the Occupied Territories” (Peretz,

1990). As members of the leadership were detained

by the Israelis–who after 18 months had detained

more than 20,000 people–their places were taken by

others.

—-The uprising shattered the barrier of fear of

the occupier, strengthened the sense of

self-reliance, and in general empowered a

population that had been systematically deprived of

control over its destiny during two decades of

Israeli occupation, and before that for 19 years

under Jordanian and Egyptian rule. The resiliency

of the uprising in spite of varied forms of Israeli

repression over many months showed that the

Palestinians had learned well how to rely on

themselves and on institutions that they created.

And while many demonstrators often threw rocks and

gasoline bombs, they generally avoided more lethal

weapons and tactics. The uprising helped

crystallize a new and much younger leadership, and

marked the beginning of a new phase of the

Palestinian national movement (Nasser and Heacock,

1990).

====The uprising provoked intense sympathy in the

Arab world and galvanized Palestinians everywhere,

bringing their cause to the attention of the world

(Gerner, 1992). Palestinians inside Israel carried

out sympathy demonstrations and strikes. A growing

number of Jews voiced doubts about Israeli policy.

As a direct result of domestic and other pressures

sparked by the uprising, Jordan’s King Hussein, on

July 31, 1988, severed his country’s links with the

West Bank and renounced Jordan’s sovereignty over

it, thereby reversing nearly 40 years of Jordanian

policy.

—-PLO leader Arafat rode a strong wave of

international support during and after the intifada

(Peretz, 1990). He was able to speak before the

United Nations General Assembly. During that U.N.

meeting, and afterwards, Arafat sought to satisfy

the United States’ two long-standing conditions for

negotiation: a recognition for the rights of Israel

to exist and a renouncement of terrorism. The

critical sentence at that speech that many thought

should satisfy the U.S. recognition requirements

was the following (Gerner, 1992):

“The PLO will seek a comprehensive settlement among the partiesconcerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people’s rights, in freedom, national independence, and respect the right to exist in peace and security for all.”

—-Yet, the United States and Secretary of State

George Shulz were not completely satisfied. Thus,

Arafat gave it one more try at a news conference

the following day, in which he said:

“In my speech also yesterday, it was clear that we mean our people’s rights to freedom and natinal independence, according to Resolution 181, and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and, as I have mentioned, including the State of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors, according to the Resolutions 242 and 338. As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet, I repeat for the record. I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism.”

—-Afterwards, the United States announced that the

PLO had met the conditions for negotiation, and

low-level talks between the PLO and the United

States ensued. But it was in 1993 when the most

significant talks took place, unbeknownst to most

of the world. Secret, direct negotiations between

Israel and the PLO took place in Norway. They

culminated in a draft peace agreement, and were

followed by formal mutual recognition between

Israel and the PLO on September 10. Three days

later the agreeement was signed on the White House

lawn and sealed by a handshake between Arafat and

Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin.

Conclusion

—-The PLO, which grew to prominence under the

organization of Yassir Arafat and which became an

international player thanks to the intifada, found

its ultimate goal of a Palestinian homeland closer

than ever with the signing of the peace agreement

with Israel. It marked a great accomplishment for

an organization that was begun by four Arab

countries in 1964. But even today it is not clear

that the PLO’s mission has been fully realized; the

election of the conservative Netanhayu government

in Israel has hampered some of the steps outlined

in the peace agreement. Thus, once again, Arafat is

trying to rally the world to the side of the PLO in

its ongoing struggle.

Bibliography

Gerner, Deborah. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Intervention into the 1990’s. ed. Peter J. Shraeder. Boulder: Rienner Publishers, 1992. pp. 361 – 382.

Nassar, Jamal and Heacock, Roger, eds. Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Peretz, Don. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

Biographical information taken from: Koury, Philip S. “Arafat, Yasir.” Colliers Encyclopedia CD_ROM. Vol.2 1996.

316